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INTRODUCTION
Is our copyright system basically fair?  Does it exacerbate or ameliorate
the skewed distribution of wealth in our society?  Does it do anything at all
for disempowered people, people at the bottom of the socio-economic hier-
archy?  In this Article we engage these questions.  Our goal is to begin a more
comprehensive discussion of the effect the copyright system has on the allo-
cation of wealth in our society.
These questions of distributive justice are atypical in scholarship on cop-
yright law.1  To begin with, the dominant methodological approach in the
field emphasizes incentives for aggregate production of information goods.2
The primary aim of this utilitarian framework is to provide economic encour-
agement to creators while insuring maximum access to the works creators
produce.  Put differently, the traditional utilitarian theory sees copyright
incentives as the mechanism through which society regulates the reward to
creators.  The goal is to set the incentives just right, so society receives the
maximum number of works of the highest quality at the lowest possible over-
all social cost.  A hefty chunk of this literature has sought to cast doubt on the
1 An exception is Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 229 (2003) (considering “copyright as a form
of authors’ welfare” and comparing government welfare support for the indigent to copy-
right protection for authors).
2 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) (describing and
critiquing the dominant utilitarian justification for IP rights).
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need for copyright—or at least copyright in its present form and strength—
to generate all the original expression we have (or want).3
More recently, academic commentators have started to focus on the “dis-
tributive” aspects of copyright and, not surprisingly, this work has shadowed
the incentive-based analyses by focusing on information distribution.  Commen-
tators working this territory have raised concerns about the general diffusion
of knowledge,4 about availability of materials in minority languages,5 and
about the ability of subsequent creators to create new expression using
existing, copyright-protected expression.6
How much wealth copyright incentives create—and who holds that
wealth—are at best secondary concerns.  The closest many scholars get to
recognizing copyright’s direct effect on income and wealth is to note that
large corporate interests, and not individual creators, wind up enjoying copy-
right’s bounty.  Copyright scholarship is replete with what we call the “corpo-
rate copyright trope,” i.e., that the “bulk of [copyright’s] expansion has
enriched copyright intermediaries, rather than creators and readers,”7 that
“increasingly intellectual properties underwrite the ‘private’ sovereignties of
multinational corporations,”8 and that “there is data aplenty to suggest that
most creative people don’t enjoy significant benefits from the operation of
copyright—at least in comparison to those which accrue to firms that func-
tion as intermediaries between creators and audiences.”9
3 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569 (2009) (proposing curbing exclusive rights over unforeseen uses of works as
unnecessary for incentives); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copy-
right in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (casting
doubt on the conventional wisdom that copyright is either a necessary or efficient means of
incentivizing creativity); Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of
Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003) (exploring rea-
sons why the case for private property is weaker in the situation of intangible goods).
4 See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257
(2010); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879–82 (2007); Lateef
Mtima, Copyright and Social Justice in the Digital Information Society: “Three Steps” Toward Intel-
lectual Property Social Justice, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 459 (2015) (proposing “social justice assess-
ment” for copyright claims).
5 See, e.g., Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 122–23
(2014).
6 See, e.g., Betsy Rosenblatt & Rebecca Tushnet, Transformative Works: Young Women’s
Voices on Fandom and Fair Use, in EGIRLS, ECITIZENS 385 (Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves eds.,
2015); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535
(2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17
LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997).
7 Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2010).
8 Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1996).
9 Peter Jaszi, If Locke Had Slept Late, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS (Ruth L. Okediji ed., forthcoming 2017) (quoted with permission of the
author; Professor Jaszi has since revised the prose but our point is that this perspective has
just become an assumption among copyright scholars); see, e.g., RONALD V. BETTIG, COPY-
RIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38 (1996) (“[S]ix
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In fact, there is no such data.  On most occasions when the corporate
copyright trope appears, it is simply a rhetorical move in favor of diminished
copyright protection.10  In general, copyright scholarship sees the income of
creative people—if it sees it at all—as a means to an end: the important job
of copyright is to stimulate production of new works.  The wealth of cre-
ators—its level and distribution—is of little interest.
Not so in this Article.  The level and distribution of wealth flowing to
creative individuals is our central concern.  Because we care about copy-
right’s impact on the distribution of wealth, we focus less on the creative
works that copyright induces and more on the money earned as a result of
these works.  We inquire into whether the pattern of earnings from copyright
can be called fair.  In particular, we review copyright law against the frame-
work for distributive justice established by John Rawls in his seminal A Theory
of Justice.
To do this, in Part I we set out the basics of Rawlsian distributive justice
and, in Part II, we apply Rawls’s principles to the real world of copyright.  We
take a close look at the incomes of creative professionals, particularly in the
music industry, and the crucial role copyright plays in helping them earn a
living.  In this Part we also consider the Rawlsian requirement that a society
provide fair opportunities for everyone to aspire to any career.  We show that
copyright does quite well under this principle in one concrete way: copyright
provides the basis for the income and wealth of most of the wealthiest African
Americans in the United States.  Part III continues the theme, looking at
some detailed rules in copyright law that further the goal of distributive jus-
tice in ways that rules of real and chattel property do not.  We reach two
conclusions: first, that copyright in its current form is a powerful tool to
empower creative individuals economically.  And second, that further
reforms could enhance copyright law’s role in adding to the income of crea-
tive individuals.  This has special relevance in a time of increasingly skewed
to ten . . . companies—will soon produce, own, and distribute the bulk of the culture and
information circulating in the global marketplace.”); TRAJCE CVETKOVSKI, COPYRIGHT AND
POPULAR MEDIA: LIBERAL VILLAINS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 100 (2013) (“Hollywood,
the US music industry and gaming industry dominate world media . . . . In the 1800s, 14
years of temporary monopoly became 50, then in the 1900s, 70 years, and now it is poten-
tially up to 120—but solely for corporate benefit.”); WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE
COPYRIGHT WARS 76 (2009) (copyright rights “are in truth owned by publishers and other
corporations who regard authors as a negative item on balance sheets to be reduced as
much as possible”); Shaver, supra note 5, at 141 (“The advantages of copyright protection
are reaped primarily by those already privileged: affluent consumers, the most successful
creators, and major publishing houses and other copyright holders located in industrial-
ized countries.”). But see Peter S. Menell, Property, Intellectual Property, and Social Justice:
Mapping the Next Frontier, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 147, 178 (2016) (recogniz-
ing, upon performing a general survey of issues, that copyright “also affects distributive
values” including “providing economic security for authors”).
10 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 9, at xv–xvi (“The argument of this book is that bad
business models, failed economic ideologies, and the acceptance of inapposite metaphors
have led to an unjustified expansion of our copyright laws.  To rectify the current imbal-
ance we must . . . have the courage to change our laws . . . .”).
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income distribution and a digital economy that concentrates wealth with
information aggregators and “those who own the top machines.”11
I. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, HOW RAWLS USES “PROPERTY,” AND THE PROPRIETY
OF USING RAWLS
Before delving into a discussion of Rawls’s vision of distributive justice,
the practical realities of copyright law for creative professionals, and how
those realities serve (and could better serve) distributive justice, we begin by
considering an important criticism: How can we argue that Rawls’s ideas
apply to intellectual property when he did not touch on intellectual property
in his writings?  For example, concerning those in the IP field who develop
theories based on “John Locke, or Hegel, or, more recently, Rawls,” Mark
Lemley has opined “those theories have more than their fair share of
problems, starting with the fact that none of these latter-day prophets of IP
actually included IP at all in their theories.”12
11 JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 11 (2013).
12 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1338–39
(2015).  Professor Lemley adds that these three philosophers “spoke of real property and
chattels, not ideas.” Id. at 1339.  Lemley is factually wrong about all three philosophers.
See JOHN RAWLS, Locke III: Property and the Class State, in LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY 138, 143 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2007) (“For Locke, property—or ‘propri-
ety in’ (as he often says)—is a right to do something, or a right to use something, under
certain conditions, a right that cannot be taken from us without our consent . . . .
[P]roperty does not mean land or resources, even if Locke sometimes seems to talk that
way.”).
Professor Lemley exacerbates the inaccuracies by writing “[W]hen John Locke wrote
of IP, it was to condemn it, not to treat it as an inherent part of the natural order.”  Lemley,
supra, at 1339 n.38.  To support this, Lemley cites only one piece of secondary literature.
Id. (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138–67 (Stephen R. Munzer ed.,
2001)). While Locke was opposed to perpetual copyright, far from condemning copyright,
in a 1694 memorandum Locke proposed that when a publisher purchases rights “from
authors that now live and write, it may be reasonable to limit their property to a certain
number of years after the death of the author, or the first printing of the book, as, suppose,
fifty or seventy years.”  Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694 Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copy-
right Historiographies), 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 555, 571 (2010) (quoting JOHN LOCKE,
Memorandum (1694), in 1 THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 375, 386–87 (Peter King ed., London,
Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1830)).  It is hard to see how Locke’s words were “con-
demning” IP.
Lemley’s description is an even worse mischaracterization of Hegel.  In his 1820 Ele-
ments of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes expressly about the rights of an author or inven-
tor to prevent others from reproducing a book or device and explains the difference
between the rights in a chattel book/device and the creator’s rights:
Since the person who acquires such a product possesses its entire use and
value if he owns a single copy of it, he is the complete and free owner of it as an
individual item.  But the author of the book or the inventor of the technical
device remains the owner of the universal ways and means of reproducing such
products and things [Sachen], for he has not immediately alienated these univer-
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We consider this sort of critique to be antithetical to the scholarly tradi-
tion: a tradition of building on, elaborating, and extending the insights of
thinkers who came before us.  We agree that it would be problematic to
speak of “Locke’s theory of patents” or “Hegel’s theory of trademarks,”13 but
it is completely legitimate to consider a Lockean theory of patents or a Hege-
lian analysis of trademark semiotics.  The general principles these philoso-
phers laid down are capable of application to all manner of problems, issues,
and institutions that either did not exist when these theorists were writing or
that they simply never considered.  It is in this spirit that we speak here not of
“Rawls’s approach to copyright,” but “a Rawlsian approach to copyright.”
A. A Primer on Rawlsian Justice
Rawls’s great life project was to figure out moral principles for structur-
ing a fair and just society.  His achievement was, in Kenneth Arrow’s words,
“[a] profound work [that] has caused us all to reconsider simple-minded util-
itarianism.”14  Rawls’s system of thought begins with a Kantian focus on the
rights of each individual, but then integrates this with an emphasis on the fair
distribution of resources.  This confluence of Kantian individualism and col-
lective concerns, together with a highly analytical way of thinking, marks
Rawls’s major contribution to the theory of social justice.  The clearest state-
ment of the twin considerations at the heart of Rawls’s project appears in his
two principles of justice, which he states as follows:
sal ways and means as such but may reserve them for himself as his distinctive
mode of expression.
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 69, at 99 (Allen W. Wood ed.,
H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1820) (alteration in original).  Hegel is very clear that “further-
ing the sciences and arts” is achieved by “protect[ing] those who work in them against theft
and to provide them with security for their property.” Id. at 99–100.  In this same section,
Hegel uses a phrase comfortably translated as “intellectual property” (Geistiges Eigentum),
id., and says “[t]hus laws against breach of copyright do attain their end of protecting the
property rights of authors and publishers to the (albeit very limited) extent specified,” id.
at 100.  In this last sentence the German phrase might be translated as “copyright” (as in
the Nisbet 1991 translation) or as “[l]aws against reprinting” (as in Dyde’s 1896 translation:
G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 75 (S.W. Dyde trans., London, George Bell &
Sons 1896)) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].  We deal with the mischaracteriza-
tion of Rawls below.
13 That is, assuming Hegel did not write about trademarks per se or unfair competition
—and to the best of our knowledge, he did not.  Hegel did, however, write about “mark-
ing” objects as a sign of possession—in the sense of the origin of the word “branding,”
which is intimately related to the origins of trademarks. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,
supra note 12, at 64 (“Of all kinds of possession this by marking is the most complete . . . .
When I seize or form an object, in each case the result is in the end a mark, indicating to
others that I exclude them, and have set my will in the object.”).
14 Kenneth J. Arrow, Rawls’s Principle of Just Savings, 75 SWEDISH J. ECON. 323, 323 n.*
(1973).  Of course, utilitarianism, in different forms, retains its faithful. See, e.g., Lemley,
supra note 12.
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First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the
just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity.15
The first of these is commonly called the “Equal Basic Liberties Princi-
ple”; the second principle is commonly called the “Difference Principle.”  By
permitting “inequalities” in income and wealth, the second principle distin-
guishes a liberal system’s distribution of wealth from a communist or egalita-
rian distribution of wealth.16  But the second principle legitimates only those
inequalities that “benefit . . . the least advantaged”; where “the expectation of
the representative occupant of the least advantaged ‘place in the distribution
of income and wealth’ [is] maximized.”17  Put differently, a society ought to
tolerate “only those social and economic inequalities that work to the advan-
tage of the least well off members of society.”18  The second part of the “Dif-
ference Principle” (2(b) above) is sometimes called the “Fair Equality of
Opportunity Principle” and its meaning is straightforward: if society is to per-
mit careers that provide above-average compensation, all members of society
ought to have a fair shot at them.19
For our purposes, it is also important to point out that Rawls actually
presents two different versions of the Difference Principle.20  The version above
is the more familiar, but Rawls also presents a more formal “lexical” version
of the Difference Principle (which G.A. Cohen also calls the “canonical”
version21):
[I]n a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first maximize the wel-
fare of the worst off representative man; second, for equal welfare of the
15 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).
16 Post-Mao Chinese communist doctrine excepted.  As Deng Xiaoping famously said
in 1975, “People’s contributions do differ . . . . Shouldn’t there, therefore, be differences in
remuneration?” ORVILLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA’S LONG
MARCH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 274 (2013).
17 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 81 (1977) (quoting RAWLS, supra note 15, at 96).
18 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 142 (2009) (describ-
ing Rawls’s second principle).
19 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT § 13.6, at 47 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001); RAWLS, supra note 15; Richard J. Arneson, What Sort of Sexual Equality Should
Feminists Seek?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 21, 22 (1998) (discussing “the Fair Equality of
Opportunity (Fair Equality) principle espoused by John Rawls” (citing RAWLS, supra note
15)).
20 Indeed, the Difference Principle evolved over the course of Rawls’s work. See gener-
ally WOLFF, supra note 17.
21 G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 17 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-JAN-17 10:47
520 notre dame law review [vol. 92:2
worst-off representative, maximize the welfare of the second worst-off repre-
sentative man, and so on until the last case which is, for equal welfare of all
the preceding n—1 representatives, maximize the welfare of the best-off rep-
resentative man.22
This version of the Difference Principle allows one to be concerned with
improving the material conditions of groups other than the worst off—pro-
vided that the worst off are not made even worse off.  Philosophers G.A.
Cohen and Rodney Peffer have offered their own elaborations of the lexical
Difference Principle.23
To understand the difference between these two versions of the Differ-
ence Principle, consider three societies with distribution of utiles per 10% of





Top 10% 2 10 12
80th 2 4 8
70th 2 4 8
60th 2 4 6
50th 2 4 6
40th 2 4 6
30th 2 4 6
20th 2 4 4
10th 2 4 4
Bottom 10% 2 4 4
In the egalitarian default position, the decile groups are merely place
keepers as all individuals are receiving the same utiles.  The simple version of
the Difference Principle says that we are justified in moving from “A” to “B”
because even though it imposes a stark inequality on the society—those in
the top decile receive 2.5 times as many utiles as anyone below that decile—
this inequality is justified if that is needed to motivate the uppermost decile
22 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 83 (emphasis added).
23 As Peffer describes the principle:
[T]his principle is to be applied lexically to one major economically distinguisha-
ble group after another such that if it is not possible to make any more headway
in maximally benefiting a less materially advantaged segment of the population
(by altering background institutions, policies, and programs . . .) then the princi-
ple is to be applied to the next major economically distinguishable (poorest)
group and so on.
Rodney G. Peffer, A Modified Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice: “Justice as Fair Rights”, XXII
WORLD CONGRESS OF PHIL. PROC. 7 (2010).
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to perform functions that effectively double the utiles for everyone else.  The
“least advantaged” (90% of the population in society “B”) have been made
significantly better off.
Now let us compare utile distributions “B” and “C.”  The simple version
of the Difference Principle does not provide a justification for “C” because
the “least advantaged”—still 30% of the society—are no better off than in “B”
while the top decile has continued to become wealthier.  But the lexical Dif-
ference Principle says we should move from “B” to “C” because we “first, maxi-
mize the welfare of the worst off representative man; second, for equal
welfare of the worst-off representative, maximize the welfare of the second
worst-off representative man, and so on . . . .”  On that basis, “C” is preferable
to “B” because it substantially increases the wealth of representative persons
in the middle of the society, i.e., “C” is preferable to “B” because it has a
better off middle class even if the position of the least advantaged class
remains stuck.
Obviously, the lexical version of the Difference Principle does not reso-
nate with pure altruism as strongly as the simple version that “inequalities are
to be arranged . . . to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”24 but the
lexical version (a) better jibes with Pareto optimality,25 and (b) better reso-
nates with our concerns about the middle class.
To these two framework principles Rawls added a “first priority rule” that
addresses times when a “less extensive” or “less than equal” package of liber-
ties might be acceptable (for example, to ensure the society survives an exter-
nal threat).26  Rawls also provided what he called the “second priority rule,”
viz., that the Difference Principle, including Principle 2(a), takes priority over
any principles of efficiency or “maximizing the sum of advantages.”27  Of
course, this distinguishes Rawlsian social justice from what would be under-
stood as traditional utilitarianism.
Every critical piece of this Rawlsian machinery has been debated for
decades.  For example, Rawls described acceptable inequalities in terms of
“primary goods,” a concept that can be understood narrowly in the sense of
consumptive goods and services or more broadly, in Amartya Sen’s words, as
“the general-purpose means for the pursuit of one’s comprehensive goals.”28
Martha Nussbaum has expanded on this notion.  She compiles a comprehen-
sive list of human capabilities that an ideal society would inculcate.  For Nuss-
baum, these capabilities enable each person to develop her or his unique
24 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 302.
25 In which the Difference Principle is rooted. See WOLFF, supra note 17, at 57
(describing Rawls’s view in the late 1950s as being that a “society should choose as its
baseline the equal distribution point closest to its production frontier, and should then
deviate from that point only in order to move to some other point, Pareto-preferred to the
baseline point”).
26 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 302.
27 Id.
28 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 64 (2009).
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personal life.29  They are important enough that a fair society would guaran-
tee every citizen the right to develop all the capabilities.  Distributive justice
then becomes a matter of fairly distributing opportunities for each citizen to
develop each capability.30
In addition to the two principles, Rawls established a “just savings princi-
ple” that extends notions of fairness over time.  It embodies the idea that
fairness across generations looks different from fairness at any moment in time;
the difference comes from the asymmetrical relationship with other people
living in different generations.31  Whereas everyone living at the same
moment can help or harm each other, previous generations can harm or
help you, but you cannot harm or help them.  On the other hand, you can
harm or help future generations, but they cannot harm or help you.32  As a
consequence, Rawls’s overall sense of justice over time has close affinities
with the concept of “intergenerational equity.”33
Rawls believed that as long as (or as soon as) one generation’s just insti-
tutions are stable, that generation should do what is necessary to allow future
people to continue to live under just institutions.  He also believed that any
one generation ought to leave its descendants at least the equivalent of what
it received from the previous generation.  Beyond these two ‘firm’ require-
ments, the principle of just savings is an equitable construct:
Thus the correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and
so all generations) would adopt as the one their generation is to follow and
as the principle they would want preceding generations to have followed
(and later generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in
time.34
In other words, as long as a generation’s own institutions are stable, it
should have the same, consistent “savings” rate as all prior generations—
meaning not just capital accumulation, but cultural development and preser-
vation, environment protection, etc.
Finally, in this overview we should provide some background on John
Rawls’s views on “property.”  At the outset, it is simply inaccurate to say that
29 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILI-
TIES APPROACH (2000).
30 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPE-
CIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); NUSSBAUM, supra note 29; Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as
Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33 (2003).
31 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 290–91.
32 Id. at 291.  It is reasonable to think that future generations “help” us simply by being
alive and flourishing—in a sense, that is what families and societies are all about.  Rawls
adopts such a “motivational assumption” in A Theory of Justice, see id. at 128, but withdraws
the assumption in Political Liberalism, believing that in a more rigorous ideal model genera-
tions are mutually disinterested. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 274 n.12 (2d ed.
2005).
33 See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 2, at 64, 270–89 (discussing “life-saving drugs” and
applying just savings and intergenerational equity to problems of fair access to patented,
life-saving pharmaceuticals).
34 RAWLS, supra note 32, at 274; see also RAWLS, supra note 19, § 49.3, at 160.
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Rawls wrote about “real property and chattels, not ideas.”35  Rawls wrote at a
very high level of abstraction and actually said extremely little about property
of any kind.36  When he did discuss property he mainly drew a distinction
between personal property and the means of production.37  He recognized that
capital accumulation included “knowledge and culture,”38 and he was con-
cerned (as we are) about the concentration of wealth and capital, whatever
the form.39
Rawls included among the protected liberties of his first principle the
right to hold at least some property, but this is limited to “personal property,”
and excludes all forms of “productive property.”40  In his later book, Political
Liberalism, Rawls gave a somewhat more detailed account of “personal
property”:
[A]mong the basic liberties of the person is the right to hold and to have the
exclusive use of personal property.  The role of this liberty is to allow a suffi-
cient material basis for a sense of personal independence and self-respect,
35 Lemley, supra note 12, at 1339.
36 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s discussion uses principally the concepts of “wealth” and
“distributive shares.” RAWLS, supra note 15, at 303 (describing “General Conception” as
involving the distribution of “income and wealth”); id. at 304 (discussing “distributive
shares”).  Indeed, the index of the first edition of Theory of Justice does not even include
“property” as a subject. Id. at xiii–xv.  Rawls develops neither a theory nor a definition of
property, but does discuss a “private property economy” as one means to establish a just
society. Id. at 270–74.
37 See id. at 271 (exploring how “there is no essential tie between the use of free mar-
kets and private ownership of the instruments of production”); see also RAWLS, supra note
19, § 42.2, at 138 (“The first principle of justice includes a right to private personal prop-
erty, but this is different from the right of private property in productive assets.”); id.
§ 52.1(a), at 177 (“And while a right to property in productive assets is permitted, that
right is not a basic right but subject to the requirement that, in existing conditions, it is the
most effective way to meet the principles of justice.”).
38 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 288 (“It should be kept in mind here that capital is not only
factories and machines, and so on, but also the knowledge and culture, as well as the
techniques and skills, that make possible just institutions and the fair value of liberty.”); id.
at 275 (describing institutions needed “in a properly organized democratic state that allows
private ownership of capital and natural resources”).
39 Rawls believed that “the wide dispersal of property . . . is a necessary condition, it
seems, if the fair value of the equal liberties is to be maintained.” Id. at 277; RAWLS, supra
note 19, § 42.3, at 139 (“[T]he background institutions of property-owning democracy
work to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent a small part of
society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well. . . . Property-
owning democracy avoids this [concentration] . . . by ensuring the widespread ownership
of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the begin-
ning of each period, all this against a backdrop of fair equality of opportunity.”).
40 See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 61, 66 (contrasting “freedom of the person along with
the right to hold (personal) property” with an initial assumption that in the just society
“the economy is roughly a free market system, although the means of production may or
may not be privately owned”); see also RAWLS, supra note 19, § 42.2, at 138 (contrasting
“private personal property” with the “right of private property in productive assets”).
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both of which are essential for the development and exercise of the moral
powers.41
Personal property appears to mean those belongings that are essential
for an effective private, personal sphere—one’s toothbrush and basic cloth-
ing, certainly—dishes, cookware, basic tools, and the like, almost for sure.
How about a personal dwelling, means of transportation, and more elaborate
possessions?  This is unclear.  Whatever the specific limits, a broad right to
property is not among the essential liberties of a just society.  It is not that
Rawls believed property should be severely limited.  To the contrary, he
thought that a civil society founded on his two principles might well establish
a wide range of property rights.42  For Rawls, wide-ranging property can be
consistent with his principles, but is not required by them.43
While Rawls did not believe that there was a basic right to own property in
the means of production, many scholars view Rawls as having been favorable
(possibly strongly favorable) to widespread ownership of the means of pro-
duction by individuals.44  He did not condemn individual ownership as
sharply inconsistent with his vision of fairness, although in the social milieu
in which A Theory of Justice was written (the 1960s) this was a fairly common
trope.  Our move here—consistent with a thick branch of Rawlsian scholar-
ship—is to elevate the discussion of property, and place it on a primary plane
in considerations of wealth distribution.
B. High Concepts, Practical Application
But this is an Article about a particular institution in present society—
copyright—and it is fair to ask whether it is appropriate to use a highly
abstract framework intended to elaborate the entirety of an ideal just society as a
tool to evaluate the relative contribution to distributive justice of one small
social institution sitting in a very imperfect society.  This question applies not just
to copyright (or intellectual property more broadly), but to any institution in
present society.  Stated simply, the question is this: Can we make “Rawlsian”
judgments about reverse mortgages, student loans, Head Start, drone strikes,
Social Security, zoning laws, charter schools, the bond market, or NSF grants?
While A Theory of Justice is concerned with the abstract framework for an
ideal society built from the ground up (that is, from the “original position”),
41 RAWLS, supra note 32, at 298.
42 See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 270–74 (writing agnostically about the choice between
socialist and capitalist production).
43 Rawls distinguishes between the use of markets—which he broadly endorses—and
expansive notions of private property, on which he is agnostic: “It is evident, then, that
there is no essential tie between the use of free markets and private ownership of the
instruments of production.” Id. at 271.  The vast majority of economists today would disa-
gree with this statement, most quite vehemently.
44 After describing how Rawls recognized “private ownership of the means of produc-
tion” as a major social institution, Robert Paul Wolff noted Rawls “is not endorsing private
ownership of the means of production or the monogamous family, although one gets the
sense that he approves of both.” WOLFF, supra note 17, at 81 n.24.
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Rawls himself recognized that his principles of justice could and should be
used in at least three different levels of judgment:
[T]he point of view of the parties in the original position, the point of view
of citizens in a well-ordered society, and the point of view of you and me who
are setting up justice as fairness as a political conception and trying to use it to
organize into one coherent view our considered judgments at all levels of generality.45
Looking both at how copyright law serves and could better serve distribu-
tive justice is appropriate because this is applying Rawlsian principles against
what Rawls called “a rough continuum of practicable basic structures.”46  For
Rawls, “[t]here is no question that the difference principle continues to
guide our decisions at the ‘legislative stage.’”47  This comes after a fair society
has been founded (out of deliberations in the original position), and when
that society is deciding how to order things practically by adopting specific
legislation.
To see this better, let us return to our comparative distributions of utiles,
but start with some existing society where there is already disparity of income.
TABLE 2
An Actual
Society B C D Bbis
Top 10% 11 12 14 15 12
80th 10 10 10 10 10
70th 9 9 9 9 9
60th 8 8 8 8 8
50th 7 7 7 8 8
40th 6 6 6 8 7
30th 5 5 5 6 7
20th 4 4 4 4 5
10th 3 3 4 4 3
Bottom 10% 1 2 4 4 1
Let us stipulate that the existing inequalities at “actual” are either justi-
fied or intractable.  The Difference Principle tells us that the move from actual
to B is justified if giving the top decile an additional utile motivates them to
work in a way that produces an additional utile for the bottom decile (and all
other groups remain unchanged).  The simple Difference Principle also justi-
fies the move from B to C (or from actual to C) because in C substantial
45 RAWLS, supra note 19, § 13.4, at 45 n.8 (emphasis added).
46 Id. § 19.5, at 71.
47 Id. at 173; see also id. at 48 (“By contrast the second principle applies at the legisla-
tive stage and it bears on all kinds of social and economic legislation, and on the many
kinds of issues arising at this point.” (citing RAWLS, supra note 15, § 31, at 195–201)).
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gains for the bottom 20% are achieved through additional reward to the top
decile.
The problem for the simple Difference Principle comes with D.  In D,
the position of the bottom 30% remains unchanged from C, but a middle
30% in the society are substantially better off by giving the top decile slightly
more rewards.  The move from C to D is not justified on the simple Differ-
ence Principle, but it is justified by the lexical Difference Principle.  Similarly,
the move from actual to Bbis would not be justified by the simple Difference
Principle, but it would be justified by the formal, lexical Difference Principle
because Bbis produces a substantially enriched middle cohort (50% of the
society) by giving the top decile additional utiles.
There is no question that this sort of “practical” analysis was considered
appropriate by Rawls himself.  Indeed, Rawls’s writings are replete with places
where practical details and historical contingencies are part of the analysis48
and while his primary goal was to lay out a fully just society, Rawls also treated
his principles as standards for assessing actual societies.49  As G.A. Cohen
characterized it, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, Rawls envisioned that the
members of a society would continue to be engaged in a “justificatory dia-
logue.”50  In that spirit, we intend this discussion as a contribution to the
ongoing conversation on the philosophical justifications of intellectual
property.
II. PRACTICAL RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, DISTRIBUTIVE REALITIES OF COPYRIGHT
The task of bringing a philosophical framework for distributive justice to
bear on a complex, real world institution is not an easy one: in a real sense
the rest of this Article will only flag certain points in the landscape and
describe broad areas where better empirical data would be needed to study
how copyright law advances Rawlsian distributive justice.  Nonetheless, we
believe that the available empirical evidence points toward copyright being
an institution that does serve Rawlsian distributive justice.  The case is not
perfect, and there is, as we said, much room for improvement.  But overall,
we think when contemporary copyright is subjected to the thorough standard
of Rawlsian fairness, it passes muster.
As to Rawls’s First Principle, we believe that copyright has relatively little
impact on Rawls’s requirement that each citizen enjoy a bundle of “equal
basic liberties” compatible with every other citizen having the same liberties.
48 In establishing an initial list of likely basic liberties, Rawls says we will refer to histori-
cally successful democratic regimes.  He quips, “Of course, the veil of ignorance means
that this kind of particular information is not available to the parties in the original posi-
tion, but it is available to you and me in setting up justice as fairness.” Id. at 45.
49 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 15.  Indeed, the jacket for his 2001 Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement explains that “Rawls is well aware that since the publication of A Theory of Justice
in 1971, American society has moved farther away from the idea of justice as fairness.”
RAWLS, supra note 19.
50 G.A. Cohen, Incentives, Inequality, and Community, in 13 TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 263, 282 (1992).
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We acknowledge that some commentators believe that the exclusive rights
conferred by copyright do adversely impact concerns that would be included
in the First Principle.  The division here may roughly fall between those who
accept and those who reject the Supreme Court’s view that copyright’s basic
policing mechanisms—non-protection of ideas, facts, processes; fair use; the
de minimis doctrine; etc.—safeguard First Amendment liberties.51  We
acknowledge that property restrictions can impinge on the exercise of basic
liberties but we believe that Rawls would have addressed these concerns via a
general discussion of concentration of wealth and ownership of the means of
production.
For example, the concentration of ownership in cable and telecommuni-
cation companies—and the varying rates they charge citizens for access to
the internet—surely has a much greater impact on the exercise of basic com-
munication liberties than does the existence of copyright.  Though copyright
does impact the cost of “high value” content—which effectively restricts
access by those who can’t pay52—internet access seems like the real “choke
point” restricting people’s ability to participate in the cultural and political
life of society.
In any event, the charge that copyright is intrinsically at war with (or in
great tension with) the First Amendment does seem overblown to us.
Beyond copyright’s internal doctrines designed to limit its effect when vital
free expression interests are at stake, as a practical matter, so much expres-
sion in cyberspace is uncopyrightable, uncopyrighted, or effectively free that
copyright does not appear to undermine people’s ability to participate cul-
turally or politically.  It is the onramp to the internet that keeps people from
exercising their First Amendment rights, not the scattered pay walls and pay-
per-view websites that one encounters once online.  Put differently, there are
vast and mushrooming public domains53 that more than offset the relatively
few restricted regions made possible by copyright law.  Indeed, copyright law
increases the public domain in several ways before the expiration of protec-
tion, as with freely-available “ad supported” content in which copyright pro-
51 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (holding that fair use prevents
conflict with First Amendment); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (holding
that fair use and idea/expression dichotomy as “traditional contours” of copyright prevent
conflict with First Amendment); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 560 (1985) (holding that fair use helps ensure copyright does not conflict with First
Amendment).
52 And are unwilling to infringe.  Non-enforcement against some infringers, particu-
larly those who cannot pay court judgments, also serves to increase access through a form
of price discrimination. See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the
Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 740–42
(2005); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of
Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997).
53 For the different ways we can view what is in the public domain, see James Boyle,
The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33, 68 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J.
783 (2006).
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vides advertisers with exclusive access to an audience instead of providing
exclusive access to works.
For these reasons we do not understand copyright to violate Rawls’s
Equal Basic Liberties Principle, that is, Rawls’s First Principle.
Following the rough order of points in Rawls’s Second Principle, let us
next consider copyright law in relation to the canonical (or lexical) Differ-
ence Principle; in relation to the “just savings principle”; and in relation to
the requirement that positions, particularly those with great wealth or
income, be “open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”
A. The Difference Principle and Jobs, Income, and Wealth from Copyright
Rawls’s Difference Principle permits economic inequalities if giving
more to the wealthiest cohorts improves the material situation of the “least
advantaged” in income and wealth.  In its canonical version, the Difference
Principle also permits economic inequalities if giving more to the wealthiest
cohorts will improve the material situation of representative persons in mid-
dle “advantaged” groups without making the worst off even worse off.
One can certainly make an argument that both patent and copyright
laws meet the simple Difference Principle by improving the material situation
of the least advantaged.  If patents give incentives for the production of tech-
nological advances that improve living conditions for all or almost all (cen-
tral heating, lighting, water purification, improved crop yields, etc.), then
even if patent law causes some concentration of wealth among inventors and
patent owners, this may be justified as inequality that makes better off the
least advantaged citizens.  While many technological innovations may address
fundamental quality of life issues that go to the “basic liberties” of the First
Principle (such as vaccines), many other technological innovations improve
quality of life in ways that are best characterized as social and economic “pri-
mary goods” (for example, color television instead of black and white,
improved wifi speeds, sturdier alloys for bicycles, cheaper lighting sources,
and so on).
Similarly, if copyrights give incentives for the production of music, litera-
ture, and audiovisual works that improve the lives of all or almost all (free
broadcast television entertainment, free broadcast radio entertainment,
libraries, etc.), then even if the copyright law causes some concentration of
income and wealth among creators and copyright owners, this may be justi-
fied as inequalities that make better off the least advantaged citizens.  We
should add that while innovations that are addressed by patent law may often
be so central to baseline quality of life that they fall under the First Princi-
ple’s “basic liberties,” this will infrequently be the case with the original expres-
sion addressed by copyright law.  When it comes to principles of distributive
justice, access to medicine and access to Madonna are not the same thing.
But our focus is on confronting the corporate copyright trope identified
earlier: the idea that copyright benefits large corporations, but not “real peo-
ple.”  To that end, we are concerned with copyright’s impact on the income of
individual citizens.  For purposes of the discussion, we stipulate that copy-
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right has little positive impact on the income of the economically least
advantaged (although we will argue later that it is a unique institution for
talented people to escape from economically least advantaged communities).
Nonetheless, we believe that copyright does have a positive impact on the
income of individual citizens in middle income groups and, under the
canonical Difference Principle, that may be enough to justify its distributive
impact.
As far as we can tell, systematic statistical collections on national eco-
nomic activity do not do a good job isolating occupations in which the exclu-
sive rights of copyright are central to the economic viability of the occupation
or important to keeping that individual in that occupation at that income level.  The
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes data iden-
tifying a number of occupations that we would consider “copyright-related”
and that have higher incomes than the median annual wage.  But some of
those occupational categories are simply too broad to draw any meaningful
connection to copyright.  For example, according to the BLS the 2014
annual median wage for all occupations in the United States was $35,54054
while the 2014 median wage for computer programmers was $77,55055 and
for “software developers” was $97,990.56  But the BLS categories of computer
programmers and software developers almost certainly include, for example,
the hundreds of programmers who work at Uber, a business model whose
success principally depends on network effects from participants, not exclu-
sive rights over code.  Similarly, the category of “technical writers”
($69,030)57 probably includes individuals whose jobs are highly dependent
on copyright but also includes individuals working in-house writing instruc-
tion manuals for consumer goods (where copyright over the manual is not
important, particularly relative to any intellectual property over the actual
product).
Other BLS occupation categories may have a closer link to copyright
protection: “writers and authors” ($58,850),58 “editors” ($54,890),59 “film
54 Occupational Employment Statistics: OES Data, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm (follow the “All data” link under May 2014, and then
see row 2, column Y for the median wage for all occupations).
55 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 15-
1131 Computer Programmers, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/
oes/2014/may/oes151131.htm.
56 Occupational Outlook Handbook: Computer and Information Technology Occupations,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-informa
tion-technology/home.htm.
57 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-
3042 Technical Writers, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/oes/
2014/may/oes273042.htm.
58 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-
3043 Writers and Authors, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015).http://www.bls.gov/oes/
2014/may/oes273043.htm.
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and video editors and camera operators” ($52,470),60 “broadcast and sound
engineering technicians” ($41,780),61 “reporters, and correspondents”
($36,000),62 “music directors and composers” ($48,180),63 and “producers
and directors” ($69,100).64  All of these positions have incomes above the
median level, although at least one occupational category one might strongly
link to copyright protection is below the median: “photographers”
($30,490).65
Perhaps most interesting is that the Bureau of Labor Statistics acknowl-
edges that it cannot even estimate an annual wage for some of the categories
one would most intuitively link to copyright protection: “actors,” “dancers
and choreographers,” and “musicians and singers.”66  For academics and
commentators who insist that copyright is “solely for corporate benefit”67 and
that the expansion of copyright “has enriched copyright intermediaries,
rather than creators,”68 there should be some reflection both about the BLS
statistics and about the BLS’s level-headed acknowledgement that for some
creators’ incomes, we simply do not have the sort of reliable data from which
we expect national policies to be formulated.  To consider what we know and
do not know further, let’s bear down on the income question for creative
individuals in the music industry—musicians, singers, composers, and the
like.
1. Income to Creative Professionals in the Music Industry
Teachers of intellectual property know the difficulty of inculcating law
students with the music industry’s basic distinction between—and separate
59 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-
3041 Editors, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2014/may/
oes273041.htm.
60 Occupational Outlook Handbook: Entertainment and Sports Occupations, BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/entertainment-and-sports/home.htm.
61 Occupational Outlook Handbook: Broadcast and Sound Engineering Technicians, BUREAU
OF LAB. STAT. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Media-and-Communication/
Broadcast-and-sound-engineering-technicians.htm.
62 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-
3022 Reporters and Correspondents, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bls
.gov/oes/2014/may/oes273022.htm.
63 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-
2041 Music Directors and Composers, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bls
.gov/oes/2014/may/oes272041.htm.
64 Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-
2012 Producers and Directors, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015., http://www.bls.gov/
oes/2014/may/oes272012.htm.
65 Occupational Outlook Handbook: Photographers, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.bls.gov/oes/2014/may/oes274021.htm.
66 Occupational Outlook Handbook: Entertainment and Sports Occupations, supra note 60
(for some of these BLS reports “[t]he annual wage is not available”).
67 CVETKOVSKI, supra note 9, at 100.
68 Litman, supra note 7, at 28.
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copyrights for—“musical works”69 (musical compositions) and “[s]ound
recordings.”70  And that is just the beginning of the labyrinth of the music
industry, a labyrinth that includes complex customs and practices in the
“music publishing” business, statutory compulsory licensing for musical com-
positions,71 special rules for reproductions of and derivative works from
sound recordings,72 complex practices among the collecting societies in the
licensing of public performance rights, and extremely complex statutory
rules for digital audio transmission of sound recordings.73
The music industry is also the creative sector whose business models
have been most subject to disruption from digital, networked technologies:
first, from illegal reproduction and distribution through peer-to-peer (“P2P”)
systems;74 then through iTunes downloads substituting for what physical unit
sales had survived P2P; then from streaming services like Spotify and Apple
Music replacing sale of downloads.  Although a few voices continue to insist
that digital piracy is not the culprit, between 1999 and 2012, inflation-
adjusted sales of recorded music contracted by more than 50%.75  On top of
all this complexity, disruption, and contraction, there is also the common
observation that creative individuals in the music industry have never been
able to assert themselves against corporate interests in the same way that crea-
tive individuals in the audiovisual industry have organized into labor unions
(artfully called “guilds”), thus forcing robust collective bargaining agree-
ments on audiovisual producers.
69 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012) (providing copyright protection for “musical works,
including any accompanying words”).
70 Id. § 101 (defining “[s]ound recordings” as “works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied”); id. § 102(a)(7)
(providing copyright protection for sound recordings).
71 Id. § 115.
72 Id. § 114(b).
73 Id. § 114(d).
74 Unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works through peer-to-peer systems has
been judged infringement in almost all courts that have considered the question. See, e.g.,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928–41 (2005); In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2001); Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v Sharman License
Holdings Ltd., [2005] 222 FCR 465 (Austl.); Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jan.
29, 2013, Hei 14 (wa) no. 4249 (Japan); Winny Creator Guilty in Copyright Violations, JAPAN
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2006/12/14/national/winny-
creator-guilty-in-copyright-violations/#.WAhDSuArKM8.
75 Stan Liebowitz, Internet to Artists: Drop Dead, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204616504577171193402114300; see also Cary H.
Sherman, What Wikipedia Won’t Tell You, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/02/08/opinion/what-wikipedia-wont-tell-you.html?_r=0 (claiming that “music
sales in the United States are less than half of what they were in 1999, when the file-sharing
site Napster emerged, and that direct employment in the industry had fallen by more than
half since then, to less than 10,000”).
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In other words, if we were looking for an area of economic and creative
activity where copyright should have failed creative individuals, it would be
hard to find a better candidate than the music industry.  And yet even in the
music industry—and with access to very little empirical data—we can see the
powerful role that copyright plays in securing incomes for creative individu-
als.  Perhaps the easiest place to see this is in monies received by “collecting
societies” that represent music composers in the licensing of the 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 right of public performance.  In the United States, the dominant col-
lecting societies are the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), both of which run as
membership-based not-for-profit organizations.  In addition, there is a third,
smaller collecting organization, SESAC Holdings (SESAC), that is a private,
for-profit entity.76
Based on public figures from the two dominant non-profits, ASCAP and
BMI—and assuming a fifty-fifty split between songwriter/composer and
(often corporate) music publisher—collective musical composition distribu-




Ending 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
BMI 394.5 398+ 374.9 407 420
ASCAP 422.5 412 413.5 425.6 441.5
This means that in the last five-year period for which we have publicly
available data, the copyright-based licensing system for musical compositions
collecting only for the public performance right distributed at least U.S. $4.1
76 About Us, SESAC, https://www.sesac.com/About/About.aspx (last visited Sept. 20,
2016).
77 The information here comes from annual reports issued by the relevant organiza-
tions.  For ASCAP, see ASCAP Is the First PRO in the World to Report $1 Billion in Revenues,
ASCAP (Mar. 3, 2015) [hereinafter ASCAP Is the First], http://www.ascap.com/press/
2015/0302-ascap-hits-a-high-note-in-its-100th-year.aspx; ASCAP Reports Strong Revenues in
2013, ASCAP (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.ascap.com/press/2014/0213-2013-financials
.aspx; ASCAP Reports 2012 Financials, ASCAP (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.ascap.com/press/
2013/0304-ascap-reports-2012-financials.aspx; ASCAP Reports Increased Revenues in 2011,
ASCAP (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.ascap.com/press/2012/0308_ascap-reports.aspx;
ASCAP 2010 Financial Results Reflect the Challenging Music Licensing Environment, ASCAP
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.ascap.com/press/2011/0331_Financial_Results.aspx.  For
BMI, see BMI, 2013–2014 ANNUAL REVIEW (2014), http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/publica-
tions/2014/BMI_Annual_Review_2014.pdf; BMI, ANNUAL REVIEW 2012–2013 (2013),
http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/publications/2013/BMI_Annual_Review_2013.pdf; BMI, AN-
NUAL REVIEW 2011–2012 (2012), http://www.bmi.com/images/news/2012/AnnualReview
_2011_2012.pdf; BMI, ANNUAL REVIEW 2010–2011 (2011), http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/pub
lications/2011/BMI_Annual_Review_2011.pdf; BMI, ANNUAL REVIEW 2009–2010 (2010),
http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/publications/2010/annual_review_0910.pdf.
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billion to American creative professionals.  But this is a low-ball estimate for collec-
tive licensing distribution to creative professionals for a few reasons.  First, a
significant percentage of songwriters/composers have now become their own
“publishers”;78 those that have get the other half of their royalty distribu-
tions, rather than splitting them with large corporate publishers.  Second,
being privately held, SESAC does not publish distribution figures, suggesting
some underestimate.79  Third, some music publishers engage in direct licens-
ing for certain public performances and those revenues—again, typically a
fifty-fifty split with creative individuals—are not being reported at all.
On the sound recording side of the industry, U.S. copyright law limits
the right of public performance to “digital audio transmission[s].”80  Crafted
in 1995, this digital audio transmission right is further divided into three
broad categories: (1) nonsubscription broadcast transmissions that are
exempted from liability,81 (2) noninteractive subscription digital audio trans-
missions (such as Pandora and SiriusXM) that are required to pay a statutory
license fee set by the Copyright Board,82 and (3) interactive digital transmis-
sion services (such as Spotify) that must privately negotiate license agree-
ments with copyright holders.83
As to the privately negotiated agreements for interactive music services
like Spotify and Apple Music, we do not have reliable figures on what individ-
ual musicians are making, but there has been substantial press criticizing
Spotify for the low royalties being paid to composers and artists.  This has
resulted in some successful artist pushback against Spotify and Apple Music
to increase those royalty payments, and lawsuits to enforce individual artists’
rights against such streaming services.84
In contrast, we know a great deal about the monies collected under the
statutory license fee under 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).  These cover noninterac-
78 See, e.g., Jason Blume, How to Start Your Own Music Publishing Company, MUSICWORLD
(Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/How_To_Start_Your_Own_Music_Pub
lishing_Company; Jon Ostrow, Benefits of Owning Your Own Publishing, SONGTRUST (Nov. 23,
2011), http://blog.songtrust.com/publishing-tips-2/benefits-of-owning-your-own-publish
ing/.
79 SESAC is about 1/20th the size of ASCAP.  Whereas ASCAP represents “10 million
works by more than 525,000 music creators,” ASCAP Is the First, supra note 77, SESAC rep-
resents “more than 400,000 songs on behalf of its 30,000 affiliated songwriters, composers
and music publishers,” About Us, supra note 76.  Nonetheless, the SESAC repertoire not
represented in the $4.1 billion figure includes the musical compositions of, for example,
Neil Diamond, Bob Dylan, RUSH, and many prominent film industry composers. Id.
80 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012).
81 Id.  This exemption includes retransmissions of the broadcast transmissions.
82 Id. § 114(d)(2).
83 Id. § 114(d)(3).
84 Ryan Faughnder, Meet the Music Entrepreneur Who’s Taking on Spotify and Other Stream-
ing Services, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/
cotown/la-et-adv-ct-jeff-price-spotify-2-20160119-story.html; Justin Wm. Moyer, Spotify Hit
with $150 Million Class Action for Copyright Infringement, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2015), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/30/spotify-hit-with-150-mil-
lion-class-action-for-copyright-infringement/.
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tive subscription digital audio transmissions, such as SiriusXM.  Those mon-
ies are distributed by a non-profit collecting society called SoundExchange,
whose board of directors includes representation from both musicians and
record labels.85  Under the statutory licensing scheme, the license fees col-
lected by SoundExchange are divided fifty-fifty between the owners of rights
in the sound recordings (typically the labels) and the artists whose perform-
ances were recorded (i.e., musicians and singers).  On the performing artist
side of the ledger, SoundExchange sends 45% of distributions to the “fea-
tured artists” and 5% to “non-featured artists, typically session musicians and
background singers.”86  Starting out with modest collections and distribu-
tions of a few million dollars in 2004, SoundExchange has now distributed
$1.5 billion in copyright-based income to individual performing artists, with
$681.5 million of that in just 2013 and 2014.87  Between the historic growth
rates and a 2015 decision of the Copyright Board as to statutory rates going
forward, it is reasonable to think that this income stream to performing art-
ists will continue to grow.
While these total figures are impressive, there are other tools to get a
sense of what copyright means to the income of individual creators in the
music business.  It is reasonable to expect that copyright will have a dramati-
cally different impact on the living standard of different kinds of creative
professionals.  We can hypothesize that professional novelists and composers
will be more dependent on copyright than professional sculptors and drum-
mers.  Even within “one” creative profession—acting—we can expect that
those actors who do mainly stage work will be significantly less dependent on
copyright than those actors who do mainly television and film work.
Peter DiCola’s groundbreaking 2013 “Money from Music” survey of
roughly 5300 musicians provides support for some of these intuitions, and
gives important insights into clusters of creative professionals in the music
industry.  DiCola concluded that working musicians as a whole get between
12% and 22% of their income from copyright-based royalties, depending on
whether and how you count payments from session playing.88  If anything,
85 Board of Directors, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/our-
team/board-of-directors/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
86 About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/artist-
copyright-owner/digital-royalties/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
87 Glenn Peoples, SoundExchange Hits $3 Billion Payout Milestone, BILLBOARD (Aug. 5,
2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6655897/soundexchange-pays-out-3-
billion (“SoundExchange . . . has distributed over $3 billion in digital performance royal-
ties to record labels and performing artists since 2003. . . . Nearly half of these royalties
have been paid in just the last two years.  SoundExchange paid out $773 million—over
25% of the total—in 2014 and $590 million—about 20% of total distributions—in 2013.”).
Performing artists get half of these amounts; owners of the sound recordings get the other
half.
88 Peter DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons
About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 304–05 (2013) (“According to my classifica-
tion of the eight revenue categories, the survey data show that, in aggregate, the musicians
in our sample earned 12% of revenue from sources directly related to copyright, 10% from
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the survey results may have undercounted copyright income as hundreds of
respondents also identified income (presumably small amounts) that trace
back to other copyright-protected activities.89
Some of the results of the 2013 survey are not surprising, including that
composers earn a higher percentage of their income from copyright and that
musicians are more likely to have multiple jobs than the average American
worker90—something that emphasizes their economic vulnerability.91  On
this count, the survey estimated average working musician hourly income—
for salaried situations—to be $28.91 per hour, with a median of $20.07, very
similar to the U.S. Labor Department’s own estimates at the time of $31.74
per hour, with a median of $22.99.92  (As of 2015, those Labor Department
figures had risen to $33.62 and $24.20, respectively.93)  The survey was heavy
on classical musicians (35% of respondents) as well as jazz artists (16%) and,
according to DiCola, “the large proportion of classical musicians in the sur-
vey sample explains the 19% share [of overall revenue] for the salary
category.”94
The “Money from Music” survey also has some other interesting nuggets:
that copyright-based income was more important for artists at the high and
low ends of the income spectrum; that income from merchandise (e.g., sale
of t-shirts at live appearances) was much, much smaller than copyright-based
sources with a mixed relationship to copyright, and 78% from sources indirectly related or
unrelated to copyright.” (footnote omitted)).
89 To reduce respondent survey fatigue (and attrition) the “Money from Music” sur-
vey’s main income allocation question (question twelve) had only eight income categories,
the eighth being “Other.” Id. at 324.  In two separate and later questions (fourteen and
fifteen), many respondents checked specific sources of income identified by the survey,
sources that are clearly related to copyright but which might not have been considered
when a survey respondent answered question twelve.  Those sources of income included
“Sound Recording Special Payments Fund,” “AFM & AFTRA,” “Intellectual Property Rights
Distribution Fund,” “Litigation Settlements from Label or Publisher,” “Sample Licensing,”
“Publishing Advance,” and “YouTube Advertising Revenue Share.” Id. at 367–68.  There
were additional income responses in question fifteen that could be copyright-related, i.e.,
“Acting,” “ASCAPLUS,” and “Film Musicians Secondary Markets Fund.” Id. at 367.  Since
the revenue musicians attributed to “Other” in question twelve was only 7% of total
income, id. at 324, we can assume that this would add only a couple percentage points at
most.  Our thanks to Peter DiCola for reviewing this point with us.
90 Id. at 322 (“The survey findings are consistent with earlier work on artistic labor
markets.  American artists—here referring to a broad category of architects and designers,
performing artists (including musicians), visual artists, and authors—are known to work
multiple jobs at a higher rate than those in other professions.”).
91 Id. at 338 (“Making ends meet financially often leads musicians to take on multiple
roles in the music industry.”).
92 Id. at 318 (citing Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-2042 Musicians
and Singers, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.bls.gov/oes/cur-
rent/oes272042.htm).
93 Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: 27-2042 Musicians and Singers, supra
note 92.  Self-employed musicians are not included in these numbers.
94 DiCola, supra note 88, at 325.
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income;95 and that copyright-based income was more important for rock and
roll artists96 (who have fewer opportunities for teaching positions and long-
term salaried work).  The survey establishes that, in rough terms, working
musicians would not be penniless without copyright—and would not disap-
pear as a creative class, particularly those residing in the patronage model of
classical orchestras.  Yet as Jordan Weissmann noted, “consider how you’d
react if your boss suddenly said you were getting a 10 percent pay cut
tomorrow.”97  Since our concern is a reasonable standard of living for creative
professionals with positions being open to all, a 12% to 22% reduction in income
for these creative occupations would be quite significant.
The data DiCola gathered adds a crucial distributive component to the
discussion over the plight of contemporary music professionals.  Almost all of
the literature that considers the sweeping changes affecting musicians, partic-
ularly the rise of online digital distribution of music, centers on whether the
public is experiencing more or less access to music, and whether that music is
of lower quality than in the preceding, pre-digital era.98  As we noted in the
Introduction, this is an example of emphasizing copyright-related distribu-
95 Id. at 338 (“[M]erchandising, branding, and licensing of one’s persona make up
only a tiny fraction of musicians’ revenue, despite the increased prevalence of social
networking.  Merchandising revenue is a tiny sliver of musicians’ revenue ‘pie.’  The aver-
age share of the merchandise revenue stream is just 2%.”).
96 Id. at 354.
97 Jordan Weissmann, Think Artists Don’t Make Anything Off Music Sales? These Graphs
Prove You Wrong, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2013), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/
02/think-artists-don’t-make-anything-off-music-sales-these-graphs-prove-you-wrong/
273571/.
98 On this, there are differences of opinion.  A serious empirical approach, based on
scoring critics’ reviews and measuring music sales and radio airplay, concluded that there
has been no deterioration in the quality of music since Napster was established in 1999,
ushering in the era of free online music.  Joel Waldfogel, Copyright Protection, Technological
Change, and the Quality of New Products: Evidence from Recorded Music since Napster, 55 J.L. &
ECON. 715 (2012). But see Touré, ‘The Song Machine,’ by John Seabrook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/books/review/the-song-machine-by-john-
seabrook.html?_r=0 (book review) (noting that revenue for recorded music has dropped
by more than 50% from its peak, and providing qualitative evidence that this translates
into lower quality music today).  Touré writes:
[A]s record sales dropped and less money could be made from recording, artists
began touring more relentlessly.  But albums are still helpful for increasing ticket
sales, so albums must still be recorded.  That means lyrics are sometimes written
on a tour bus as it moves from city to city, and vocals are recorded in makeshift
studios in hotel rooms.  This seems like a harder path to making meaningful
music than settling into a beautiful studio in Los Angeles or Memphis or Kingston
and staying until the spirits deliver a heavenly gift.  And all of that is why over the
last decade we have watched the music business slowly atrophy.  It’s withering
away before our eyes.  Not only are the people inside it no longer so arrogant; in
some cases they’re pretty anxious.  They’re watching the last gasps of a dying
model.  Or, as Thom Yorke called Spotify, “the last desperate fart of a dying
corpse.”
Id.
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tion of information products, as opposed to the distribution of wealth and
income from copyrighted goods.  DiCola’s survey reorients the discussion.
Instead of seeing music professionals as mere instruments (so to speak), to
be paid as little as possible for producing the music we want, DiCola brings
attention to the practical and personal realities of the music-making class.
This in a nutshell represents the shift from analyzing the distribution of infor-
mation to analyzing the wealth-related effects of copyright.  From this point of
view, we get a much different perspective on copyright and distributive
justice.
2. Copyright Interests of Individuals Through the Lens of Litigation
The study of copyright litigation from 2005–2008 by Christopher
Cotropia and James Gibson99 provides another perspective contrary to the
corporate copyright trope.  In their study, Cotropia and Gibson found 17,119
copyright cases filed in federal court during those four years; of those, they
coded 957 randomly chosen cases.100  Cotropia and Gibson concluded that
the cases were best analyzed in three broad groups: Performance Rights cases
(62 cases involving musical compositions), File Sharing cases (512 cases
against P2P uploaders), and the remaining 383 “[c]ommonplace” cases.101
The fact that the file-sharing cases are the majority of the Cotropia/Gib-
son study (53.5%) arguably supports the corporate copyright trope, but we
agree with Cotropia and Gibson that the file-sharing lawsuits are not a staple
part of the copyright ecology.102  They were an understandable response by
copyright owners to an unprecedented spike in copyright infringement,103 a
response that appears to have ended as other enforcement mechanisms have
come online.  Now, there seems to be a new, emerging equilibrium of
authorized supply, enforcement tools, and consumer response.
As to the Performance Rights cases, there are sixty-two lawsuits in the
study.104  Since these are ASCAP and BMI enforcement actions against busi-
nesses playing music, they are always brought on behalf of music publishers
and individual composers.  Many of the music publishers are subsidiaries of
big media corporations, but many are not.  Since half the proceeds of an
ASCAP/BMI enforcement will go to the composer, these cases hardly sup-
port the corporate copyright trope.  We have already discussed the financial
99 Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study
of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981 (2014).
100 Id. at 1986.
101 Id. at 1988–89, 1991, 2004.
102 Id. at 2013 (concluding that “[o]ne can therefore safely ignore” the File Sharing
cases “when discussing today’s litigation trends”).  Of course, we do not deny that the
2005–2008 file-sharing cases show that “big media” can bring substantial legal rights to
bear on individuals who violate copyright law—that is obviously true, but irrelevant to our
point.
103 See generally Hughes, supra note 52.
104 See id.
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structure of ASCAP/BMI and the billions of dollars they distribute to individ-
ual authors.105
Cotropia and Gibson focus most of their analysis on the 383 non-cookie
cutter copyright lawsuits that are neither file-sharing nor performance rights
enforcement actions.  Of those actions, less than 15% were filed by Fortune
1000 companies—big media—while over 21% were filed by individuals.106
The remainder of the lawsuits (64.23%) were filed by incorporated entities
below the Fortune 1000.107  That group could include some very large com-
panies, but most appear to be independent producers, small animation
houses, lesser known fashion designers, and lots of “SOHO”—small office/
home office—operations.108  Indeed, even in the Central District of Califor-
nia—the home of Hollywood—big television and motion picture companies
were plaintiffs in only 28.16% of the cases filed.109  As befits a data set of
cases brought principally by individuals and small and medium-sized enter-
prises, instead of most cases being about infringement of multiple works in a
big corporate library, 177 of the 383 cases alleged infringement of only one
work and 226 of the 383 cases alleged infringement of only one or two
works.110
Given the wide potential range of who makes up the 64.23% middle-
sized plaintiffs in the Cotropia/Gibson study, what is important to us is prin-
cipally that individuals outnumbered big media three to two as plaintiffs, a
fact that is certainly contrary to the corporate copyright trope.
And, again, there is a connection between copyright protection (or per-
ceived copyright protection) and employment—that is, livelihoods for crea-
tive professionals.  Another finding of the Cotropia/Gibson study that is out
of sorts with received wisdom in IP academia is the very large number of
copyright suits on fashion designs.  Cotropia and Gibson found that in their
set of “commonplace” copyright litigation, in 2004–2008, 12.01% were dis-
putes about fashion and clothing.111  These disputes were concentrated in
the Southern District of New York and the Central District of California
105 See supra subsection II.A.1.
106 Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 99, at 1992.
107 Id.
108 The authors report that companies in the Fortune 1000 had annual revenues just
over a billion dollars, meaning that a company could have $800 million in revenue and
count as “small” in the Cotropia/Gibson study, but the authors report that “anecdotally,
most of these small firms are really small firms (small architectural firms, mom and pop
shops, etc.).”  E-mail from Chris Cotropia & James Gibson to Justin Hughes & Rob Merges
(Sept. 30, 2014, 15:02) (on file with authors).
109 Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 99, at 2008.
110 These numbers come from the Cotropia/Gibson dataset available at Copyright Data
Project, COPYRIGHT LAW DATA (last visited Nov. 25, 2016) (see “copyright litigation data”);
see E-mail from Chris Cotropia to Justin Hughes & Rob Merges (Nov. 21, 2016, 05:01) (on
file with authors).
111 Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 99, at 1996.
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where—we think not coincidentally—75% of America’s salaried fashion
designers are employed.112
At the same time, the Cotropia/Gibson study could be taken for its
implicit normative meaning as much as or more than a descriptive account of
the current importance of copyright to creative professionals.  The research-
ers found that when the primary plaintiff was an individual (presumably a
creative professional), there was an increase in the likelihood in an adver-
sarial ruling (rather than settlement);113 that plaintiffs who were individuals
lost more often;114 and that when the copyright-protected work’s author was
one of the plaintiffs, this also increased the likelihood that the defendant
would prevail.115  Professor Gibson attributes some of this to individual plain-
tiffs being outgunned by corporate defendants,116 but surely some of this is
due to an “endowment” effect in which authors “may prove too romantic
about their own creations.”117  But if the payoff of the corporate copyright
trope is that copyright can be weakened or abandoned because it only bene-
fits corporations, the Cotropia/Gibson study supports our view that to the
degree copyright unduly benefits corporations, the right policy response in
terms of distributive justice is to strengthen the propensity of copyright to
increase the wealth and income of creative professionals, not to abandon
copyright altogether.
112 Spotlight on Statistics: Fashion, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., (June 2012), http://www.bls
.gov/spotlight/2012/fashion/ (see slide 9) (“Within the United States, most fashion
designers work in large cities, such as New York or Los Angeles.  In May 2010, almost 75
percent of all salaried fashion designers worked in New York and California.  California led
the nation, with a total of 4,480 employed fashion designers.”).  The high incidence of
lawsuits over fashion designs also undermines a popular theme in the recent intellectual
property literature: that fields lacking in intellectual property protection can nevertheless
become thriving centers of innovation. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN,
THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012).  For a critique,
emphasizing that the case studies supporting this theory (other than the fashion industry)
involve small, marginal industries, and pointing out that fashion designers themselves
appear not to subscribe to the theory, see Robert P. Merges, Economics of Intellectual Property
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi ed., forthcom-
ing 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412251.
113 See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 99, at 2015.
114 Id.
115 See James Gibson, Small Fry in Copyright Litigation, THE MEDIA INST. (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/012914.php.
116 Id. (“[I]ndividual plaintiffs are likely to be outgunned; when an individual filed a
case, he or she was facing a bigger defendant (either a small firm or a Fortune 1000 com-
pany) about 85% of the time, and a disparity of resources would presumably follow.”)
117 Id.  This endowment effect for those who create copyrighted works is documented
in Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 31, 39–40 (2011).
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B. What About Lost Utility Among Poorer Consumers from Above-Margin Prices
and Deadweight Losses?
Although as we have said, our primary focus is on incomes, we must take
a moment to address an obvious concern.  The classic economic analysis of
copyright is based on a tradeoff: the legal right gives market power (often
short-handed as a “monopoly”), but this raises the marginal cost of copyright-
protected works to consumers.  When a consumer chooses to buy a copy-
right-protected work, it is possible to argue that by definition he or she loses
nothing: the exchange of money for the work is at least an even trade.  But
when a consumer is “priced out” of the market for a work he or she wanted,
and was willing to pay at a lower price, that is another story.  Here the loss of
value from a purchase that would have been made represents a real loss to a
consumer.  This is because by assumption a consumer who is willing to buy a
product at a certain price desires that product (at that price) more than all
alternative purchases.  Demand curves, in other words, are constructed sub-
ject to the budget constraints of all consumers.  Thus if the price for the
product is X, those consumers who would have purchased at price X-Y suffer
a real loss or harm.  This is the dreaded “deadweight loss.”
The classic response to this argument in the intellectual property con-
text is to say that it suffers from a baseline problem.118  It assumes the exis-
tence of a work, and goes on to show that pricing the work above marginal
cost creates a deadweight loss.  But assuming the existence of a work runs
counter to the basic rationale for copyright—that without the incentive of
market power, the work will never be created.  To put it simply, the language
of marginal cost and deadweight loss is about how best to allocate a pie; the
language of copyright incentives is about how to get someone to bake a pie in
the first place.
There is, in turn, a classic rebuttal.  Many, maybe most, works are cre-
ated without being induced by copyright incentives.  The market power that
copyright provides is an afterthought.  We can, in other words, assume there
is a pie and then decide whether to give the person who baked it market
power in setting its price.  This makes deadweight loss a real concern.
118 Paying more than marginal cost for a copyright-protected work arguably “harms” a
consumer because the “extra” money spent (beyond marginal cost) could and would have
been spent on something else.  But this argument suffers from an obvious baseline prob-
lem.  It assumes a world where the copyright-protected work exists; if this is not true—if
the lack of copyright means that the work in question is never created—then it assumes a
false baseline.  And even if a work would be created without copyright so that selling it at its
marginal cost is possible, calling the higher price occasioned by copyright (and the market
power it confers) a “harm” to the consumer is no more natural than calling it a “windfall”
when the consumer has extra money in his or her budget due to the lower (marginal)
price of a work. See generally MERGES, supra note 2, at 56–58 (contesting the argument that
frustrated consumers who want a product but are unwilling to pay market price have
experienced “waste” in the sense used by philosopher John Locke); David McGowan, Copy-
right Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that who wins the consequen-
tialist debate over copyright is determined by who is assigned the burden of proof as to
whether works will be produced, indicating the need for some other rationale).
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But this argument, response, and rebuttal are all framed in terms of utili-
tarianism and we must adjust the discussion if we are talking about distribu-
tive justice, particularly Rawlsian justice.  Let us do this step-by-step.  We will
need to consider both (a) when transactions occur (at the price sought by
the copyright holder) and (b) the deadweight loss problem where the trans-
action has been stymied by the price sought by the copyright holder.
First, we believe that the incentive structure made possible (or more eas-
ily possible) by copyright induces the creation and distribution of works that
improve the position of all levels of the society.  We recognize that there is a
fundamental divide over this basic question of how many copyright-protected
works are actually induced by the promise of copyright119 (and at what level
of quality120).  Notice, however, that where exclusive rights are truly
unneeded for creation and distribution—blogs unsupported by ads, user-
generated content on YouTube, etc.—many works are freely distributed
despite the existence of copyright law.  The possibility of exclusive rights does
not mean everyone exercises them.121
Second, we believe that individual decisions to purchase access to copy-
righted works are market decisions that increase overall utility.  That transac-
tions occur means that both buyer and seller are better off.122  And this is
true wherever a buyer is in the distribution of wealth.  A person in the ninth
or tenth income decile who buys copyright-protected product A such that
money is transferred from this person to a fourth or fifth decile person is at
least as well off after the purchase as before.  The same is true of a person in
the first or second decile who buys product A, resulting in a wealth transfer
to the fourth or fifth decile person.  Rawls would agree with basic economics
on this preliminary point,123 even if the income deciles and the distribution
of people within them do not meet the requirements of his definition of
distributive justice.
119 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2009) (noting that growth in
copyright registrations appears “a function of population” more than a function of
“increasing copyright protection”).
120 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Motion Pictures, Markets, and Copylocks, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 941 (2016) (describing Nigerian film industry’s success but low quality in a commer-
cial environment with minimal copyright protection).
121 Because it is easy to voluntarily eschew property rights (through failure to claim
them, by waiving them, or by simply not enforcing them), but hard to create property-like
structures without state-backed rights, property regimes are more flexible and permit
greater individual choice as compared to regimes that prohibit individual property rights.
See Robert P. Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: Property and Flexibility in the Digital Era, 34
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 113 (2011) (“[W]aiver contributes to the supple texture of prop-
erty rights, making it easy for individuals to exercise choices after rights have been granted.
This is, in my view, a cornerstone feature of property rights, and one of their chief advan-
tages over other entitlements and incentive regimes.”).
122 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 9, at 188 (“No one is required to purchase IP-protected
goods.  Therefore, in an exchange economy, only those who value such goods more than
their cost will purchase the goods.”).
123 RAWLS, supra note 32.
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To determine if a given transaction contributes to meeting those condi-
tions, a Rawlsian asks whether after the transaction there is an increase in
inequality.124  This does not happen when the person in the first or second
decile buys A and there is a transfer to a person in the fourth, fifth, or eighth
decile.  So, we can immediately eliminate those transfers from our concern
even if the price is higher than would be necessary to incentivize the creation of work A.
Our concern is when the transaction to get A to the consumer in the
eighth decile transfers wealth to someone in the second decile, when the
purchase by the consumer in the fourth decile transfers wealth to someone
in the first decile, or whenever wealth moves from “lower” to “higher” deciles
after a purchase.  In those situations, we ask whether the money transferred
was more than needed for creation and distribution of the work.  We recog-
nize that there may well be some “superstars” of the entertainment business
who are earning far more than is needed to induce their maximum produc-
tivity, just as there are many bankers, CEOs, physicians, and lawyers who are
earning more than is needed to induce their maximum productivity.  In all
of these situations, Rawlsian justice might call for a diminution of the individ-
ual’s income.125  On the other hand, there is no evidence that the large
cohorts of creative professionals in middle-income groups are earning more
from copyright than is needed for creation and distribution of original
expression.  To us, the opposite might be inferred from the fact that musi-
cians earn, on average, 10% of their income from copyright and have to
cobble together the rest of their income, including from many non-perform-
ance activities (such as giving music lessons).  A creative individual who works
in other jobs—an actor who also sells real estate, a writer who drives a cab—
does not appear to be earning more from the transactions based on copy-
right than would be appropriate under Rawlsian justice.126
That is our response to the concern that the transactions that do occur
based on copyright are contrary to Rawlsian justice, but this still leaves the
problem of deadweight loss from the transactions that do not occur.  We
could dismiss this problem with a simple argument: if the price premium has
been brought down to the point where the Difference Principle is met (no
inequality is being generated that is not needed for incentives), the dead-
weight loss from economic theory causes no inequality—because the work
would be not be produced and distributed at all without the market power
that causes the deadweight loss.  But we think the copyright system has char-
acteristics that additionally address the concern of deadweight loss: simply
put, there are factors that mitigate consumer harm due to the market power
conferred by copyright.
One is the availability of substitutes.  The narrow scope of copyright pro-
tection and the structure of the copyright entitlement produce numerous
often highly similar substitute works: these fairly close substitutes for any par-
ticular copyrighted work should drive down the market price of any particu-
124 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 83.
125 See id.
126 See id.
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lar work.  Beyond the copyrighted substitutes, the public domain offers a rich
array of substitution possibilities.  While, generally speaking, older
pharmaceuticals may not be as effective as new generations of medical treat-
ments that are still under patent protection, it is hard to claim that public
domain expressive works—particularly in literature and fine arts—are not as
good as works protected by copyright.
Another element constraining possible deadweight losses is the “version-
ing” of distribution of copyrighted works.  Music is readily made available
without out-of-pocket cost to the consumer in ad-supported formats (tradi-
tional radio, ad-supported Spotify, YouTube); books and e-books are made
available without cost by public libraries; a substantial amount of audiovisual
production is ultimately made available without cost through television and
online venues.  Finally, to the degree that the copyright system has “leakage”
and poorer people are more likely to engage in unauthorized downloading
and streaming, this also produces de facto price discrimination in which
cohorts unwilling to pay have access to copyrighted works.127  We believe that
all of this, taken together, suggests deadweight loss may be quite limited.128
Finally—and most importantly—if one’s concern is wealth distribution
and all its complexities, that concern is not well-served by general theories
that cut back copyright’s exclusive rights, whether it is substantial expansion
of fair use, sharply curtailing the copyright term, or eliminating the derivative
work right.  Thoughtful advocacy for public support of programs that help
public libraries and independent artists, and that subsidize low-income pur-
chasers of copyright-protected works, are all far more effective ways to
address the needs of the poorest members of society.  And they are much
fairer than drastically cutting back on copyright.  To aim targeted assistance
127 See Hughes, supra note 52, at 741–42 (viewing certain levels of unauthorized distri-
bution as free distribution on a price discrimination model).  Others have made the same
observation that “leakage” through incomplete enforcement of copyright produces de
facto price discrimination.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1369 (1998) (arguing that “all intellec-
tual property law operates by fostering price discrimination”); Meurer, supra note 52; see
also William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988)
(suggesting fair use as de facto price discrimination that diminishes the need for express
price discrimination).
128 There is indirect support for this in some data showing that the poorest Americans
(those in the bottom fifth of the income distribution) spend almost exactly the same per-
centage of their total expenditures on entertainment of various types as is spent by all
other people, whatever their incomes.  Ann C. Foster, Movies, Music, and Sports: U.S.
Entertainment Spending, 2008–2013, 4 BLS: BEYOND THE NUMBERS, no. 6, Mar. 2015, at 1, 3
tbl.1, http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-4/pdf/movies-music-sports-entertainment-
spending.pdf (revealing that entertainment spending, as percentage of total expenditures,
by quintile, measured 4.9% for lowest fifth of earners; then 4.5, 4.3, 4.7, 4.9, and 5.2 for the
next four fifths).  This does not prove directly that they are not harmed by copyright, but it
does show that there are entertainment products available in a price range that is within
the means of the lowest earners.  This is of course consistent with the idea that there are
many mechanisms imposing price discipline and thereby limiting the harm caused by
deadweight loss.
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at the poorest consumers, while preserving the “middle-class” enhancing
aspects of copyright, seems to us much more in the Rawlsian spirit.
C. Copyright and the Just Savings Principle
The engine of Rawls’s Difference Principle is modulated by two addi-
tional elements; the first being the just savings principle discussed in Part II
above.  Copyright addresses this requirement of intergenerational equity
through two primary mechanisms.  First, we assume that copyright provides,
at least in a meaningful swath of cultural and informational production, a
genuine incentive structure, i.e., that more culture and information is pro-
duced than would be without copyright.  As long as this culture and informa-
tion is preserved—a complex issue in which both copyright and copyright
exceptions have an important role—cultural “equity” is being accumulated
across generations.  On this point, it merits pointing out that Rawls’s just
savings principle does not require elimination of property (or exclusive)
rights: just savings could occur in a society as wealth accretes and passes from
private hands to private hands intergenerationally.  At least, Rawls does not
indicate otherwise.
But copyright further enhances intergenerational equity by being time-
limited, which means that future generations will enjoy unfettered access to
all copyrighted works after the copyrights lapse.  As long as the promise of
“Limited Times” is maintained, a boom in protected content today leads to a
richer and broader public domain tomorrow.129  Copyright’s expiration pro-
vides an endpoint to private wealth concentration; in this respect, copyright
(and patent) seem to “double down” on just savings: not only does the cul-
tural stockpile accumulate at a consistent pace, but a growing stockpile is
freely available to all.
We also believe that there is another, subtler mechanism at work in copy-
right industries for just savings across generations.  Copyright is part of an
institutional environment that strengthens classes of creative professionals
over time and across generations with knowledge creation, preservation, and
transmission.  Of course, copyright’s importance varies among different
groups of creative professionals, but with groups for whom copyright contrib-
129 As several scholars have shown, intellectual property rights in year one increase the
public domain in year one (and onward), and not just when those IP rights expire.  This is
because (1) unprotectable elements of an IP-protected work become available to the pub-
lic immediately (the “idea” of a copyrighted work, as opposed to its expression, for exam-
ple; or disclosed but unclaimed technology in an issued patent or published patent
application); (2) the IP right might prove invalid or might not be enforced against some or
all who use it; or (3) IP protection by one corporate rival may lead other rivals to invest in
public domain information designed to offset the first rival’s IP rights. See MERGES, supra
note 2, at 147–49 (discussing enforcement levels and how they affect de facto levels of IP
protection); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183
(2004) (noting that competitor investments in IP-free content to offset proprietary strate-
gies may enhance the public domain); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellec-
tual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).
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utes to continuing viability or vitality, copyright helps ensure that the next
generation receives at least as much in know-how as did the current genera-
tion.  In other words, conservation of a creative ecosystem is not just about
preserving vast repertoires of public domain materials; it is about maintain-
ing and transmitting vital creative traditions.
Consider, for example, the many specialized skills needed to make a fea-
ture film.130  Aside from the relatively glamorous jobs of scriptwriting and
directing, there are dozens of niche functions to be performed: line produc-
ers (who keep track of major budget categories and coordinate produc-
tion),131 location managers,132 set dressers,133 prop specialists,134 makeup
artists, costume designers and makers, light and sound technicians, camera
people, post-production effects specialists—it is a very long list.  All of these
specialized skills have been built up over many years.  To recreate them
would be expensive and difficult.  We do not often think of this sort of infra-
structure as an endowment bestowed on future generations, but it is.
Nor is it overblown to show concern about the hollowing out of this
ecosystem.  Sociologists and historians of technology have long noted the
many subtle and interdependent skills required to produce complex, multi-
dimensional products.  A classic example is the attempt to move from techni-
cal information contained in German patents seized during World War I to
the actual production of the commercial dyes covered by the patents.135
These efforts failed miserably.  There is a degree of know-how, sometimes
called “tacit knowledge,” in complex production processes.  When this knowl-
edge is no longer accessible—once there is a gap in the person-to-person
transfer of this “knowledge in the bones”—it can be exceedingly difficult to
recreate it.  A similar story has been told with respect to NASA’s Saturn V
rocket—which was taken out of production and is now considered a “lost
art.”136  Thus copyright, by maintaining the conditions for creative profes-
130 See, e.g., BRYAN MICHAEL STOLLER, FILMMAKING FOR DUMMIES (2d ed. 2008).
131 Id. at 101 (“Line producing an independent . . . film is actually an art form; it
requires great skill . . . .”).
132 See LOCATION MANAGERS GUILD INT’L, http://locationmanagers.org (last visited
Sept. 19, 2016).
133 See About Us & Contact, SET DECORATORS SOC’Y OF AM., http://www.setdecorators
.org/?art=about (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
134 See MOVIE PROP ASS’N, http://www.moviepropsassociation.org (last visited Sept. 28,
2016) (Movie Prop Association members are authorized dealers of movie props).
135 See, e.g., Robert J. Baptista & Anthony S. Travis, I.G. Farben in America: The Technolo-
gies of General Aniline & Film, 22 HIST. & TECH. 187, 193 (2006) (“Thus the production of
intermediates at [the U.S. company] in 1920, some 114,000 pounds, represented just five
products, notwithstanding the fact that the company had obtained the rights to 1200 Ger-
man patents on dyes, intermediates and related chemicals . . . . The German patents, how-
ever, did not provide sufficient details to enable replication of the inventions claimed.
[The company] lacked the specialized knowledge to commercialize the dye patents and
expand the product line beyond the staples that competitors were also making.” (footnote
omitted)).
136 See Amy Shira Teitel, The Lost Art of the Saturn V, VINTAGE SPACE (Apr. 3, 2011),
https://vintagespace.wordpress.com/2011/04/03/the-lost-art-of-the-saturn-v/
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sionals to practice their crafts, indirectly helps to preserve the skill base of
these creative professions across generations.
Having made this claim, we want to recognize three things.  First, we
recognize that there are no historical examples of what has happened to
knowledge accretion, preservation, and transmission in a creative profes-
sional class where copyright (or other IP) rights were suddenly eliminated.
Second, we recognize that there may be—in a narrow framework—situations
where less copyright would cause more literal knowledge transmission (as when
creative professionals struggle to survive by teaching more).137  Third, we rec-
ognize that with sufficient state support, patronage, or simple lead time, a
class of creative professionals can survive without copyright and thereby pass
on their know-how.  As examples, there was a filmmaking industry under
Mao, Eisenstein made his cinematic classics in the (copyright-less) early
Soviet Union, and low-budget “Nollywood” survives largely on lead times (in
a relatively low-tech distribution environment).138  Some commentators
would point to the fashion industry and open source software as models of
creative classes flourishing over time without copyright.139  We think these
last two examples are more complex than usually presented,140 but to the
(“[B]uilding the [Saturn V] rocket at [the very rapid] rate [of the 1960s] and with so many
subcontractors means the people who oversaw and understood the actual assembly and
overall working of the Saturn V were few.  Each contractor recorded the workings of their
stage and records survive about the engines used, but only a handful of engineers . . . knew
how Saturn V puzzle fit together.  It is possible to work backwards to recreate individual
aspects of the technology, but the men who knew how the whole vehicle worked are gone.
No one alive today is able to recreate the Saturn V as it was.”).
137 As F.M. Scherer notes in his seminal study of how composers earned their livings in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “Economic incentives affect the specific chal-
lenges to which individuals, creative or not, allocate their time.”  F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER
NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE ECONOMICS OF MUSIC COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND
NINETEENTH CENTURIES 6 (2003); see also id. at 64 (“Twelve years later, however, when his
finances were solid, [composer Carl] Czerny reported to Felix Mendelsohn that he was
spending less time teaching and more composing, since the latter yielded a better financial
return”); see also Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity: Evidence from
Italian Operas (Oct. 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2505
776 (discussing how the adoption of copyright by successive states within Italy led to a
significant increase in the number and quality of new operas introduced each year).
138 Lights, Camera, Africa, ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/17723124/print.
139 A strong case that lead time, not exclusive IP rights, provides the basis for a substan-
tial creative class in the fashion industry is made in RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 112,
at 52–56; see also Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1718 (2006) (claiming that the
relative lack of IP protections in the fashion industry has not stifled innovation and may in
fact serve the industry’s interests).
140 See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 99, at 2016 (showing a very large number of
copyright infringement cases where both the plaintiff and defendant were in the apparel/
fashion/textile sector).  And the society best known for its fashion industry creative profes-
sionals—France—has quite robust protection of fashion designs.  Raustiala and Sprigman
do not thoroughly evaluate the French fashion industry, see supra note 139, at 1736 n.96.
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degree they are true, none detracts from copyright enhancing the continua-
tion of a creative professional class and the knowledge accretion, preserva-
tion, and transmission that entails.  One of the reasons indigenous peoples
and developing countries have relentlessly pursued international protection
of folklore or “traditional cultural expression” is the recognition that finan-
cial returns can keep cultural traditions alive.141  This is no less true in
Hollywood than it is for first peoples around the world.
D. Copyright and Conditions of Fair Equality of Opportunity—and the
Hard-to-Miss Experience of African Americans
A final requirement built into the Second Principle is that even if the
social and economic inequalities can be justified under the Difference Princi-
ple, being on the bountiful end of the inequalities—that is, being rich and/
or powerful—must be “attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”142  In short, if there is not egalita-
rian equality of outcomes, there must nonetheless be equality of opportunity.
For Rawls, equality of opportunity is much more than just legal equality of
opportunity, a view that might be identified with libertarians.143  Rawls is con-
cerned with inequalities of opportunity rooted in natural and social contin-
gencies,144 and his just society is presumably one that gives all children equal
access to pre-school, kindergarten, K-12 education, sports programs, summer
camps, music lessons, university, and the like.145  Beyond education, there
must also be fair and equal opportunity in the job market, qualifying exams
and benchmarks for various professions, capacities to start new businesses,
ability to migrate across both professions and regions, access to venture capi-
tal, etc.  In Brian Barry’s apt description, there should be the “elimination of
all [unequalizing] factors except that of genetic endowment.”146
Obviously, American society still fails to meet this ideal.  Despite pro-
gress against racial, ethnic, religious, and gender bias, American society still
grapples with wildly unequal educational opportunities for children and
See generally Merges, supra note 112, for a critique of the fashion industry point, and the
general “negative IP space” literature in which it appears.
141 See generally Justin Hughes, Traditional Knowledge, Cultural Expression, and the Siren’s
Call of Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1215 (2012); Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The
Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 37, 84 (2010).
142 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 83.
143 COHEN, supra note 21, at 91 (proposing “equality of opportunity as . . . understood
by laissez-faire libertarians” to mean that “opportunity is . . . equal when there is no legal
bar, such as exists under slavery or serfdom, to anyone’s economic or social self-advance-
ment”).  Rawls is clear that “positions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all
should have a fair chance to attain them.” RAWLS, supra note 15, at 73.
144 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 72.
145 Id. at 73 (“Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not depend
upon one’s class position, and so the school system, whether public or private, should be
designed to even out class barriers.”).
146 1 BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 222 (1989).
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increasingly “sticky” income inequality: it is still true that your best chance to
have wealth is to be born into (or close to) it.  As the Economist observed as
early as 2004, American society, which prides itself on meritocracy, is becom-
ing “[m]ore dynastic than dynamic.”147  And while de jure bias has remained
more virulent against the LGBT community than any other group, it is with
the African-American community that American society has failed most sys-
tematically to provide practical “fair equality of opportunity.”
We begin this discussion keenly aware that conversations of race issues
can be fragile and difficult,148 but also with the conviction that all of us need
to confront the fact that in our country, “the concentration of poverty has
been paired with a concentration of melanin.”149  For people born
1955–1970, if you were white, you had a 4% chance to grow up in a poor
neighborhood; if you were black, the likelihood of growing up in a poor
neighborhood was 62%.150  And this disparity continues: in 2009—after the
Great Recession that began in 2007—the median net worth of white Ameri-
can households was almost $98,000 while the median net worth of African-
American households was $2170.151  In other words, for every dollar held by
the average white household, African-American families held two cents.152
In the words of sociologist Patrick Sharkey, “Blacks and whites inhabit
such different neighborhoods . . . that it is not possible to compare the eco-
nomic outcomes of black and white children.”153  Indeed, for half a century,
those studying the situation have accepted that poverty among African-Amer-
ican citizens “is a special, and particularly destructive, form of American pov-
erty.”154  And to the degree that political power—and the opportunity for
147 Meritocracy in America: Ever Higher Society, Ever Harder to Ascend, ECONOMIST (Dec. 29,
2004), http://www.economist.com/node/3518560.
148 In words both light and serious, the playwright David Mamet described the problem
we face: “[T]here is nothing a white man can say about race that isn’t either offensive or
incorrect.”  Savannah L. Barker, David Mamet’s ‘Race’ Attempts to Tackle Complicated Issues,
NEON TOMMY (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.neontommy.com/news/2014/09/david-mamet-
s-race-attempts-tackle-complicated-issues.
149 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), http://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.  Or, as South
Carolina state Senator Vincent Sheheen (D) said in the summer of 2015, “There’s a quiet
bigotry that still exists, and if those of us who are white don’t say anything . . . then we’re
part of the problem.”  Amber Phillips, 6 Key Moments from the South Carolina Senate’s Strik-
ingly Blunt Confederate Flag Debate, WASH. POST (July 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/06/4-key-moments-from-the-south-carolina-senates-strik
ingly-blunt-confederate-flag-debate/.
150 Coates, supra note 149.
151 Jesse Washington, Black Economic Gains Reversed in Great Recession, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July 9, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2011/07/09/
black_economic_gains_reversed_in_great_recession/.
152 Id.
153 Coates, supra note 149.
154 Id.  Or, as President Lyndon Johnson said in a 1965 speech at Howard University:
Negro poverty is not white poverty. . . . Many of its causes and many of its cures
are the same.  But there are differences—deep, corrosive, obstinate differences—
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political office—correlates with wealth, this also means a structural under-
empowerment of African Americans politically.155
There is no need for us to explore the historical causes for this situation;
we need only observe that this correlation between race and socio-economic
disempowerment means our society is far further from the just society than it
should be, particularly in its failure to ensure that “offices and positions [are]
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”156  Our ques-
tion is whether the copyright regime is neutral in relation to that socio-eco-
nomic disempowerment, possibly exacerbates that disempowerment, or
possibly ameliorates that disempowerment.  We make the strong claim that the
copyright system as it presently functions, warts and all, arguably provides the
most robust mechanism for disadvantaged groups, particularly African Amer-
icans, to accumulate wealth in American society.  In this sense, copyright is a
modest tool to enhance Rawlsian distributive justice in an imperfect society.
Let us first consider other scholars’ observations about copyright and race,
and then elaborate on how copyright modestly helps ameliorate distributive
injustice in American society vis-à-vis African Americans.
1. Observations to Date About Copyright and African Americans
A number of commentators have explored the intellectual property sys-
tem in relation to the socio-economic situation of minority groups—with
insights both broad and narrow.
In terms of observations about copyright law itself, one broad observa-
tion has been that intellectual property laws have not rewarded African
Americans for the creation of styles of music and dance—ragtime, jazz,157
blues, R&B, and many specific dances158—which were appropriated by white
artists.  As to such “mainstreaming” of cultural styles and genres created by
African Americans, the only way to turn such appropriation into misappropria-
radiating painful roots into the community and into the family, and the nature of
the individual.  These differences are not racial differences.  They are solely and
simply the consequence of ancient brutality, past injustice, and present prejudice.
Id.
155 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1553 (2002) (noting that the very reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo and its prog-
eny establishes that groups with less property, i.e., African Americans, have less political
voice).
156 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 83.
157 Jeffrey Melnick, Tin Pan Alley and the Black-Jewish Nation, in AMERICAN POPULAR
MUSIC: NEW APPROACHES TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 29, 41 (Rachel Rubin & Jeffrey Mel-
nick eds., 2001); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over Afri-
can-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1185 (2008) (“[T]hough
African-Americans had certainly invented ragtime and jazz, these musical styles were being
brought to their highest levels by [White] outsiders.” (second alteration in original) (quot-
ing Melnick, supra, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
158 See, e.g., Dawn Lille, The Charleston, DANCE HERITAGE COALITION (2012), http://www
.danceheritage.org/treasures/charleston_essay_lille.pdf (explaining the Charleston’s ori-
gins among the descendants of African slaves in the American South).
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tion would be to apply new forms of ownership to broad swaths of the cultural
landscape.  Not only would such ownership be at odds with free expres-
sion159 and vibrant cultural development, but such a system would require
daunting judgments of “source.”160  And much of what was appropriated
from African Americans is culture that was developed by African Americans
with elements from mainstream culture.161  Only in a fixed snapshot of time
can cultural appropriation look like a one-way street.162
More focused critiques of copyright law’s potential disparate impact on
minorities include that the fixation requirement handicaps protection of
original expression from artistic and social communities that emphasize oral
or impromptu creativity;163 that musical notation’s representation of musical
159 Specifically, the idea-expression dichotomy. See Greene, supra note 157, at 1200
(“The import of the idea-expression dichotomy is that copyright does not protect styles of
performance pioneered by Black innovators.”); K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black
Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 382–83 (1999)
(“The idea-expression doctrine has also penalized the most innovative artists in blues, jazz,
and rock, essentially denying protection of their signature styles and denying compensa-
tion for the creation of genres.”).
160 See, e.g., DAVID BYRNE, HOW MUSIC WORKS 95 (2012) (“Another loop of influence
and inspiration occurred when African musicians imitated the imported Cuban recordings
they heard—which were themselves a mutation of African music.  The African guitar-based
rhumba that resulted was something new and wonderful, and most folks hearing it
wouldn’t think it was a poor imitation of Cuban music at all.  When I heard some of those
African bands, I had no idea that Cuban music had been their inspiration.  What they were
doing sounded completely original to me, and I was naturally inspired, just as they had
been.”).
161 See JAMES HASKINS, SCOTT JOPLIN: THE MAN WHO MADE RAGTIME (1978).  In Copy-
norms, Greene writes:
One of the leading dances of the era, the Cakewalk, became incredibly popular in
America.  “Blacks . . . had subsequently adapted and amended the two-step
[spawned by the marching music of John Philip Sousa] and created the ‘cake-
walk’ . . . [a dance whose] primary characteristic was promenading in an exagger-
atedly dignified manner.  By the mid [1890s], [W]hites had in turn adopted the
cakewalk and [W]hite composers would make a fortune selling cakewalk sheet
music.”
Greene, supra note 157, at 1192 n.71 (alterations in original) (quoting HASKINS, supra, at
74); see also PAUL OLIVER, SCREENING THE BLUES: ASPECTS OF THE BLUES TRADITION 202
(1968) (discussing how “in general the jazz-blues songs borrowed more from the folk
idiom than they fed into it”); Greene, supra note 159, at 363 (noting that “[b]lack slaves in
America passed down the African musical tradition, incorporating European music styles
to create something totally new” (footnote omitted)).
162 Or, as David Byrne has said, “[I]t can be tricky to assign a value judgment based on
a particular frozen moment in the never-ending cycle of change.” BYRNE, supra note 160,
at 113.
163 See Greene, supra note 159, at 378 (“Perhaps the most taxing structural element of
the copyright regime vis-a-vis Black artists has been the requirement of reducing works to a
tangible form.”).  To the degree that pre-1976 law required musical compositions to be in
notation in order to be considered “fixed,” this had a further discriminatory impact on
musical forms like improvisational jazz that might be recorded without being reduced to
musical notation. Id. at 380.
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composition fails to capture the nuances of creativity in much African-Ameri-
can music;164 and, as a historical criticism, that pre-1976 formalities and
registration requirements handicapped protection of original expression of
authors who lacked sophisticated knowledge of the law or access to legal
representation.165
Recognizing elements of copyright that have had disparate impact on
the African-American community does not imply that copyright laws were
drafted with discriminatory purpose166 or even awareness of discriminatory
impact.  For example, the compulsory license to “cover” musical compositions
has been criticized for disparate impact on African Americans (who found
their compositions re-recorded by white musicians),167 although the compul-
sory license was originally put in place to address monopoly concerns related
to player pianos.  Contrast this with Social Security law, which, at its incep-
tion, excluded farmworkers and domestics:168 that “neutral” limitation made
65% of working African Americans ineligible, a form of de facto discrimina-
tion to which the NAACP understandably objected.169
Copyright laws have not been attacked as racist or prejudicial in the way
that Social Security and mortgage financing have.170  As Keith Aoki con-
cluded in his own work in this area, “[T]he relationships between black musi-
cians, white musicians, publishers, and recording companies are more
164 See generally Olufunmilayo Arewa, Writing Rights: Copyright’s Visual Bias and African
American Music 25–26 (U.C. Irvine Sch. of Law, Legal Stud. Research Paper Series No.
2012-9, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010024.
165 Our thanks to Ruth Okediji for emphasizing this point. See also Greene, supra note
159, at 353–54.
166 We interpret this to be Professor Greene’s perspective.  Greene, supra note 157, at
1203 (“Copyright law was not designed with interests of African-American authors in mind.
However, copyright law was not intentionally designed to disadvantage Black cultural
production.”).
167 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 600–01 (2010) (“[C]opyright law provisions that permit cover
recordings have, particularly in the past, been used in a way that reinforces existing racial
hierarchies.”); Reebee Garofalo, Crossing Over: From Black Rhythm and Blues to White Rock ‘n’
Roll, in R&B, RHYTHM AND BUSINESS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC 112, 124–25
(Norman Kelley ed., 2005) (detailing African-American artists whose songs were re-
recorded “by [a white] artist in a style thought to be more appropriate for the mainstream
market”).
168 Farmworkers and domestic workers were not covered in the original Social Security
Act.  Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-721, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).  However, both groups
acquired coverage under the 1950 amendments.  Social Security Act Amendments of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-734, ch. 809, § 210, 64 Stat. 494 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 410 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010)).
169 Coates, supra note 149.
170 For continued problems in how the mortgage finance system operates against Afri-
can Americans, see Peter Eavis, Race Strongly Influences Mortgage Lending in St. Louis, Study
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/business/deal
book/race-strongly-influences-mortgage-lending-in-st-louis-study-finds.html?_r=0 (discuss-
ing a new study finding that race remains an important factor regarding where banks pro-
vide mortgages in Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and St. Louis).
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complex and textured than a one-size-fits-all narrative of ‘rip-off’ and unilat-
eral theft would suggest.”171
2. Copyright and Positions “Open to Everyone Under Conditions of Fair
Equality of Opportunity”
John Rawls believed that his principles of justice should be brought to
bear especially when “certain fixed natural characteristics are used as
grounds for assigning unequal basic rights, or allowing some persons only
lesser opportunities.”172  That, we think, too often describes the de facto situ-
ation of African Americans in American society.  Our strong claim is that the
copyright system as it presently functions arguably provides the most robust
mechanism for African Americans to accumulate wealth in American society
and, therefore, in Rawlsian terms, contributes substantially to the existence
of a cluster of social “positions” that are truly “open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity.”173  We will support this claim with one data set
and leave it to the reader to decide the probability of the claim.
While this is a strong claim,174 its strength should not be misunderstood.
Copyright would be a better tool with some of the policy alternatives we
describe later in this Article.  More importantly, copyright is a meager tool
for distributive justice compared to basic social reforms that are possible—
principally, a significant (multi-decade) strengthening and equalization of K-
12 public education.  Indeed, we believe that copyright would be a better dis-
tributive tool if coupled with a substantially strengthened educational system
for minorities.
In 2009, Forbes magazine published a list of the wealthiest African Ameri-
cans in the United States.  It has not updated it since.  Using its 2009 num-
bers as a base175 and adding information from a number of sources,
including other lists176 subsequently released by Forbes, we can build a rough
sketch compendium of the wealthiest African Americans:
1. Oprah Winfrey: $3 billion (television, multimedia, publishing)
2. Michael Jordan: $1 billion (athletics, endorsements)
3. Sean “Diddy” Combs: $735 million (music, apparel, beverage and
liquor)
4. Andre “Dr. Dre” Young: $700 million (music, endorsements,
investment)
171 Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special
Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 755 (2007).
172 RAWLS, supra note 19, § 18.5, at 65.
173 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 83.
174 And, to the best of our knowledge, a claim that has never been made before.  For
the closest observation we have found, see Raymond Millien, The Real McCoy: Should Intellec-
tual Property Rights be the New Civil Rights in America?, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 11, 2012), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/11/11/the-real-mccoy-should-intellectual-property-rights-be-
the-new-civil-rights-in-america/id=29828/.
175 See infra note 182.
176 See infra note 182.
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5. Sheila Johnson: $700 million (television)
6. Janice Bryant Howroyd: $610 million (staffing company)
7. Tiger Woods: $580 million (athletics, endorsement)
8. Robert Johnson: $550 million (television)
9. Shawn “Jay-Z” Carter: $550 million (music, apparel)
10. Mariah Carey: $520 million (music)
11. Ervin “Magic” Johnson: $500 million (athletics, business,
endorsements)
12. Tyler Perry: $400 million (television, film)
13. Bill Cosby: $400 million (television)
14. Ulysses Bridgeman: $400 million (athletics, fast food)
15. Floyd Mayweather: $400 million (athletics, endorsements)
16. Donahue Peebles: $350 million (construction)
17. Shaquille O’Neal: $350 million (athletics)
18. Quincy Jones: $350 million (music)
19. Percy “Master P” Miller: $350 million (music)
20. Berry Gordy: $345 million (music)
21. Russell Simmons: $340 million (music, apparel)
22. Prince: $300 million (music)
23. Quinton Primo: $300 million (real estate)
24. Lebron James: $270 million (athletics, endorsements)
25. Beyonce Knowles: $250 million (music)
We are not financial journalists and make no claim that this list would be
as accurate as an updated Forbes list.  Our list assumes that no one on the
2009 Forbes list lost substantial wealth unless we found a press report to that
effect, but we also did not adjust wealth for inflation.  Additional individuals
made our list from reports in specialized media177 and from more narrowly
focused Forbes stories.178
177 See Top 12 Richest African Americans, RICHEST LIFESTYLE (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www
.richestlifestyle.com/richest-african-americans-of-2015/; see also Brent Kelley, What Is Tiger
Woods’ Net Worth?, ABOUT.COM (Nov. 23, 2015), http://golf.about.com/od/tigerwoods/f/
tiger-woods-net-worth.htm; A. Mallo & Othelloucb, The Blackbuzzworthy Annual List of the
Richest Black (African American) People—2015, BLACK BUZZ WORTHY (Jan. 2015), http://
blackbuzzworthy.com/the-richest-african-americans-in-2015-up-to-date-list/; Mariah Carey
Net Worth: How Much Is Mariah Carey Worth?, CELEBRITY NET WORTH, http://www.celebri-
tynetworth.com/richest-celebrities/singers/mariah-carey-net-worth/ (last visited Nov. 26,
2016).
178 See Dan Alexander, Record 290 Newcomers Join Forbes Billionaires List, Including Michael
Jordan, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2015/03/02/
record-290-newcomers-join-forbes-billionaires-list-including-michael-jordan/; Zach
O’Malley Greenburg, The Forbes Five: Hip-Hop’s Wealthiest Artists 2015, FORBES (May 5, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2015/05/05/the-forbes-five-hip-
hops-wealthiest-artists-2015/#6ef64e2d167e; Luisa Kroll, Living the Dream: The Most Success-
ful, Self-Made Women in the U.S., FORBES (May 27, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
luisakroll/2015/05/27/forbes-first-ever-ranking-of-americas-richest-self-made-women/
#555391344e36.
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But exactitude is not needed for our point.  It is abundantly clear that
for all but a couple people on this list, what are traditionally identified as
“copyright industries”—music, film, television, broadcast professional sports,
and publishing—were the avenues for the accumulation of the most substan-
tial African-American fortunes.  Commensurately, this means the establish-
ment of powerful voices for the African-American community in our
country’s civic life.179  And as these are the richest African Americans, it mer-
its pointing out that almost all of these individuals are self-made billionaires
and millionaires; in contrast to the substantial presence of inherited wealth
on more general lists, the richest African Americans made it on their own.
There are seven professional athletes on this list, and it might be
objected that professional sports are not “copyright industries.”  Not so.
National Basketball Association (NBA) teams derive approximately 20% of
their overall revenues from television—and that $930 million in annual
broadcast fees is expected to roughly treble in the new contract for exclusive
broadcast rights between the NBA and ESPN.180  In the case of the sole
boxer on the list, Floyd Mayweather, one report placed his take from the May
2, 2015, Mayweather-Pacquiao fight at $72 million from ticket sales and $59
million from various broadcast rights.181  So, we think it is fair to attribute a
substantial amount of these seven individuals’ wealth accumulation to copy-
right (the rest being rooted in real property control of sports venues, trade-
mark, and right of publicity).
We now return to the question of “positions” that are truly “open to
everyone under fair conditions of equality”: looking across the rosters of the
NBA, economist Seth Stephens-Davidowitz found in 2013 that forty-eight pro-
fessional African-American players were produced per one million inhabi-
tants in the United States versus two professional white players per one
million inhabitants.  One would be hard pressed to find another elevator for
socio-economic advancement that advantages African Americans so starkly—
179 And we do not know how far down into the list of wealthy African Americans this
would go.  By our calculations, the next four people on the list would be Diana Ross ($250
million), John W. Thompson ($250 million), Will Smith ($220 million), and Curtis “50
Cent” Jackson ($155 million), with only Mr. Thompson building his wealth in a non-copy-
right industry. See infra note 182.  However, in the summer of 2015 Mr. Jackson declared
bankruptcy in the wake of a messy revenge porn lawsuit.  Andrea Peterson, 50 Cent Filed for
Bankruptcy Days After Losing a Revenge Porn Lawsuit, WASH. POST (July 14, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/07/14/50-cent-filed-for-bankruptcy-
days-after-losing-a-revenge-porn-lawsuit/?wpisrc=nl_tech&wpmm=1.
180 NBA Extends Television Deals, ESPN (Feb. 14, 2016), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/
_/id/11652297/nba-extends-television-deals-espn-tnt.
181 Dan Rafael, Mayweather-Pacquiao Eclipses 4.4 Million PPV Buys, $72M Gate, ESPN (May
12, 2015), http://www.espn.com/boxing/story/_/id/12872711/floyd-mayweather-manny-
pacquiao-fight-shatters-all-live-gate-record (estimating that “Mayweather could earn $250
million . . . [and that the] event will easily soar past $500 million in total revenue,” based
on multiple sources, such as approximately $72 million in ticket sales, $40 million from
international television rights, $19 million in national closed circuit revenue, $6.9 million
in closed circuit revenue, and $13.2 million in sponsorships).
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and, again, the economics of professional sports relies on copyright and trade-
mark protection.
We want to emphasize that in presenting these figures we are not saying
that copyright is ‘the’ solution to black poverty, or to poverty generally.  But
as far as we can tell, this correlation between copyright-based industries and
African-American wealth has been true for several years.182  We have no
doubt that this correlation is partly a function of racial barriers in other pro-
fessions and business structures.  Indeed, it is really no surprise that as early
as the 1920s, one of the most successful African-American-owned businesses
was in a copyright industry: the short-lived Black Swan Records, based in
Harlem.183
We should also repeat that we are not proposing that copyright has
wealth redistributive impact for African Americans as a whole, as would be
needed in an argument about wealth distribution to meet Rawls’s Difference
Principle.  Our argument is that on the Rawlsian question of “conditions of
fair equality of opportunity” copyright is doing much good whereas many
other social structures are not.184  And, again, there is no doubt that among
those other social structures our public schools at all levels have failed Afri-
can-American children.185
182 In 2006, three years before the Forbes list, on The Rich Register’s list of wealthiest
African Americans, the top five spots were held by people in copyright-related industries
(Oprah Winfrey, Robert L. Johnson, Sheila C. Johnson, Berry Gordy, and Catherine L.
Hughes). See THE RICH REGISTER, 2006, at xxii.  That publication’s top twenty-five had
greater diversity of industries [including wealth accumulated from “healthcare services,”
Merrill Lynch, and American Express] but we are doubtful of its accuracy because it fails to
include so many people who, by Forbes’s calculation in 2009, would have been in The Rich
Register’s top ten. The Forbes 400, FORBES, (Matthew Miller & Duncan Greenberg eds., Sept.
30, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/29/forbes-400-buffett-gates-ellison-rich-list-09-
intro.html.  Our assumption is that, even for self-made people, accumulated wealth does
not change that quickly for that many people.
183 Ivo De Loo & David Davis, Black Swan Records, 1921 to 1924: From a Swanky Swan to a
Dead Duck, 8 ACCT. HIST. 35 (2003).  According to Davis and De Loo, “[A]t its peak, the
company had a staff of 30 people with an anticipated weekly payroll of $1,200, and royalty
payments amounting to $30,000 per annum.” Id. at 49. De Loo and Davis calculate that
the company’s overheads were “excessive” and unsustainable. Id. at 51.  For many facts De
Loo and Davis cite Jitu K Weusi, The Rise and Fall of Black Swan Records (Spring 1996)
(unpublished M.A. term paper, Brooklyn College), http://www.redhotjazz.com/blackswan
.html.
184 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 302.
185 Trends in public education to prepare disadvantaged young people to exploit the
copyright system are also not good.  A study funded by the National Endowment for the
Arts shows that the percentage of African-American and Hispanic high school students
who have received some music education in childhood has declined precipitously over the
past three decades. See NICK RABKIN & E.C. HEDBERG, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS,
ARTS EDUCATION IN AMERICA: WHAT THE DECLINES MEAN FOR ARTS PARTICIPATION 15–16
(2011), https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/2008-SPPA-ArtsLearning.pdf.
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3. Further Considerations on Copyright and “Conditions of Fair Equality
of Opportunity”
One way to understand how copyright affords “fair equality of opportu-
nity” for wealth creation is that copyright is often the propertization of what
we call “talent.”  Copyright is the legal regime whereby an exclusively owned
res consisting of original expression comes into existence where there was
only public domain material before.  Patent law shares this characteristic: pat-
ent law is the legal regime whereby an exclusively owned property consisting
of a technological innovation comes into existence where the technology did
not exist before.  Viewed in isolation, each law can distribute wealth to indi-
viduals through fair equality of opportunity because each law gives property
claims to individuals.  But this positive impact on fair equality of opportunity
is often muted by the other laws and social circumstances that interact with
copyright and patent law.
We have already emphasized how copyright only works its equality of
opportunity magic when there are sufficient educational opportunities.
Indeed, we speculate that the level of positive opportunities created for Afri-
can Americans by industries undergirded by copyright law does not have a
strong parallel in industries undergirded by patent law largely because of the
failure of our educational system to provide African-American children with
fair conditions of equality of opportunity for advancement in “STEM”
careers—science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.186  Historically,
both patent law and copyright law may have been essentially neutral laws187
embedded in and interrelated to discriminatory laws and practices (such as
the difficulty for black inventors of accessing [white] patent lawyers),188 but
186 For example, in the United States in 2008, African Americans earned 41.5% of the
non-science and engineering doctorate degrees awarded to minorities who were U.S. citi-
zens or permanent residents while African Americans earned only 18.6% of the science
and engineering PhDs. MARK K. FIEGENER, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NUMBERS OF U.S. DOCTOR-
ATES AWARDED RISE FOR SIXTH YEAR, BUT GROWTH SLOWER 4 (2009), http://files.eric.ed
.gov/fulltext/ED507250.pdf.  According to one report, while African Americans are 12%
of the U.S. population, “[i]n 2009, they received just 7 percent of all STEM bachelor’s
degrees, 4 percent of master’s degrees, and 2 percent of PhDs.”  Jesse Washington, Declin-
ing Numbers of Blacks Seen in Math, Science, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20111023/us-blacks-in-math-and-science-/; see also Doctoral
Degree Awards to African Americans Reach Another All-Time High, 50 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.
6, 6–10 (2005) (reporting that “[w]hites are far more likely than blacks to earn doctorates
in the natural sciences” and that there is a “very large racial Ph.D. gap in the natural
sciences”).
187 For example, patent applications did not and do not tell the USPTO the race of the
applicant, and Professor Lisa Cook writes that “a comparison of a sample of similar patents
obtained by white and African-American inventors shows that the time between patent
application and grant for the two groups was not significantly different, 1.4 years in each
case.”  Lisa D. Cook, Violence and Economic Activity: Evidence from African American Patents,
1870–1940, 19 J. ECON. GROWTH 221, 226 n.15 (2014).
188 See generally ROSS THOMSON, STRUCTURES OF CHANGE IN THE MECHANICAL AGE: TECH-
NOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1790–1865, at 311–18 (2009) (discussing the
importance of social ties and networks for invention and patenting in the nineteenth cen-
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as an avenue for present-day wealth accumulation something has happened
to separate the two fields.  The historical prominence of inventors like Elijah
McCoy, George Washington Carver, and Lewis Latimer189 cannot hide the
fact that African Americans are substantially underrepresented today in
research and development.
Separately, there is the problem of business practices.  Much of the criti-
cism that has been leveled against copyright on behalf of African Americans
has really been about business practices or, at best, the interaction of copy-
right, contract law, and unscrupulous (and racist) business people.  Specific
claims for historical racial bias have pointed to low royalty payments to Afri-
can-American artists,190 unfair and often downright fraudulent contract prac-
tices to deprive African Americans of IP rights,191 and music publishers
frequently “claim[ing] co-authorship for famous blues songs, although the
publishers themselves played no role in creating such songs.”192  These his-
torical critiques of copyright have focused on the music industry and we
think it would be difficult to disagree with Chris Ruen’s observation that
“there’s been a lot of exploitation in music, particularly in this country with
black musicians.”193
Beyond the entrepreneurship of a Tyler Perry, a Prince, or an Oprah
Winfrey, there is the question of “fair equality of opportunity” for minorities
and women in the larger structure of intellectual property industries.  We are
past the days of “systematic exclusion of black personnel from positions of
power within the [music] industry,”194 but frankly neither Silicon Valley nor
tury); Cook, supra note 187, at 226 (analyzing how racial violence and discriminatory laws
suppressed patenting by African Americans).
189 See generally THE BLACK INVENTOR ONLINE MUSEUM, http://www.blackinventor.com
(last visited Oct. 21, 2016).  For a database of African-American patent holders, see African
American Patent Holders Database, KNOWLEDGE BANK, https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/handle/
1811/5941 (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
190 Greene, supra note 157, at 1193.
191 Arewa, supra note 167, at 603 (“Blues musicians were typically bound by ‘race’
recording contracts that were in many instances exploitative . . . .”); Stephen Calt, The
Anatomy of a “Race” Music Label: Mayo Williams and Paramount Records, in R&B, RHYTHM AND
BUSINESS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC 90, 102–03 (Norman Kelley ed., 2005)
(describing how contracts with early ‘race’ record label Paramount “cheated” artists such
that “[n]ine of out ten [African-American] Paramount artists . . . received no royalty,
regardless of their record sales”); Greene, supra note 157, at 1194–96.
192 See, e.g. HOWARD REICH & WILLIAM GAINES, JELLY’S BLUES: THE LIFE, MUSIC, AND
REDEMPTION OF JELLY ROLL MORTON 91–92 (2003).  Reich and Gaines note that the prac-
tice allowed publishers such as Walter Melrose to “double-dip, collecting the publisher’s
traditional 50 percent of royalties, as well as an additional 50 percent of the songwriter
royalties.” Id. at 92; see also Calt, supra note 191, at 103 (“The chief means by which dishon-
est recording officials of the era cheated artists was by filching composer credits for their
songs in order to draw a publishing royalty.”).
193 CHRIS RUEN, FREE LOADING: HOW OUR INSATIABLE HUNGER FOR FREE CONTENT
STARVES CREATIVITY 138 (2012).
194 Garofalo, supra note 167, at 112.
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Hollywood is doing as well as they should in creating diverse workforces that
empower women and minorities.
In the case of high technology, there have been regular allegations that
the start-up investment world is “almost entirely male” (and white) and that
among established tech giants there is a “paucity of women in senior posi-
tions.”195  According to Sue Gardner, former executive director of the
Wikimedia Foundation, as of 2014, women held roughly 15% of the technical
roles in Silicon Valley companies and this percentage has been steadily dropping
since the late 1980s.196  The statistics for African Americans and Latinos are no
better.  While African Americans represent 12% of the entire U.S.
workforce,197 at Google and Facebook, just 2% of U.S. employees are
black;198 at Intuit, that number rises to 4%.199  At Apple, blacks are 7% and
Latinos are 11% of the company’s U.S. workforce.200  As of 2015, Twitter is
perhaps the worst offender on these metrics: African Americans account for
more than 25% of Twitter users but only 2% of the Twitter domestic
workforce.201
On the entertainment industry side, the complete lack of acting Oscar
nominees of color—in 2015 and again in 2016—has become a cause celebre
among celebrities.  In 2014, not quite 2% of top-grossing films were directed
by women and less than 5% were directed by African Americans.202  The
numbers of women in “power jobs in Hollywood . . . trail far behind the
percentage of females in executive positions in other heavily male-dominated
195 Richard Waters, Shaking the Silicon Valley Boys’ Club, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/92d2e5f4-c960-11e4-b2ef-00144feab7de.
196 Sue Gardner, Opinion, Why Women Are Leaving the Tech Industry in Droves, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-gardner-women-in-tech-
20141207-story.html (“Multiple studies have found that the proportion of women in the
tech workforce peaked in about 1989 and has been steadily dropping ever since.”).
197 Jefferson Graham, Magic Johnson Can Solve the High-Tech Diversity Gap: Call Him, USA




200 Amit Chowdhry, Apple CEO Tim Cook Is ‘Not Satisfied’ with Employee Diversity, FORBES
(Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2014/08/13/apple-ceo-tim-
cook-is-not-satisfied-with-employee-diversity/#3bf14f504bd1; Sam Colt, Apple Releases Disap-
pointing Employee Diversity Numbers, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2014), http://finance.yahoo
.com/news/apple-releases-disappointing-employee-diversity-162303728.html.  However,
this improved slightly in 2015.  Hayley Tsukayama, Apple Is Slightly More Diverse than It Was
Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2016/01/19/apple-is-slightly-more-diverse-than-it-was-last-year/.
201 Brian Fung, Another Top Twitter Employee Is Slamming the Company’s Lack of Diversity on
His Way out the Door, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2015/11/04/another-top-twitter-employee-quits-over-lack-of-diversity/
(“[B]lacks account for more than 25 percent of the [Twitter] user base but just two per-
cent of its U.S. workforce.”).
202 Jessica P. Ogilvie, Whites, Camera, Action: How Can Hollywood Unions Promote Diversity?,
L.A. WKLY. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.laweekly.com/news/whites-camera-action-how-can-
hollywood-unions-promote-diversity-6556106.
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endeavors”203 and there have been embarrassing differentials in what male
and female actors of the same draw are paid, even in the same film.204  Inter-
estingly, women appear to have had a larger share of significant directorial
and screenwriting positions in the film industry of the early twentieth cen-
tury,205 but according to journalist Jessica Ogilvie, “Hollywood’s transition
from silent films to talkies forced executives to deal with Wall Street for loans.
Hollywood began answering to Wall Street, sidelining women because the
financiers didn’t back them.”206  To the degree that is true, it might also
impact Silicon Valley: if the financing mechanisms for an industry remain
“old school,” then power and wealth stays concentrated with those who ini-
tially had the power and wealth.  To us, all of this only confirms the value of
copyright as a mechanism for “fair equality of opportunity” by giving at least
some people of talent greater leverage.
The issue of “fair conditions of equality of opportunity” is not just an
issue of public education, job markets, and access to venture capital.  Even in
the case of professional basketball players, economist Seth Stephens-Davido-
witz found that coming from wealthier neighborhoods and more stable fami-
lies remains a significant advantage—for both white and African-American
players207—despite the perception that African-American players tend to
203 Jessica P. Ogilvie, How Hollywood Keeps Out Women, L.A. WKLY. (Apr. 29, 2015), http:/
/www.laweekly.com/news/how-hollywood-keeps-out-women-5525034; see also Rebecca Kee-
gan, Gender Bias in Hollywood? U.S. Digs Deeper to Investigate the Industry’s Hiring Practices, L.A.
TIMES (May 11, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-0512-aclu
-women-directors-update-20160509-snap-story.html (discussing the EEOC’s expansion of its
investigation into gender discrimination in Hollywood).
204 William Boot, Exclusive: Sony Hack Reveals Jennifer Lawrence Is Paid Less than Her Male
Co-Stars, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/
12/exclusive-sony-hack-reveals-jennifer-lawrence-is-paid-less-than-her-male-co-stars.html;
Ogilvie, supra note 203 (“Hacked Sony emails between Andrew Gumpert of Columbia Pic-
tures, Doug Belgrad of Sony Motion Picture Group and Amy Pascal of Sony confirmed that
superstar Lawrence got seven ‘points’ of back-end compensation, compared with Renner’s
nine.”).
205 See Ogilvie, supra note 203. See generally CARI BEAUCHAMP, WITHOUT LYING DOWN:
FRANCES MARION AND THE POWERFUL WOMEN OF EARLY HOLLYWOOD (1997); HILARY A. HAL-
LETT, GO WEST, YOUNG WOMEN! THE RISE OF EARLY HOLLYWOOD (2013); KAREN WARD
MAHAR, WOMEN FILMMAKERS IN EARLY HOLLYWOOD (2006).
206 Ogilvie, supra note 203.
207 Dr. Stephens-Davidowitz found that among African-American players in the NBA,
the poorest 20% of counties in the United States produced 42 players per million inhabi-
tants while the richest 20% of counties in the United States produced 67 players per mil-
lion inhabitants.  This difference is greater than first appears when one remembers that
the richest counties will tend to have smaller percentages of African-American populations
overall.  However, his empirical work also showed the poorest 20% of U.S. counties
produced more African-American players than the second 20% or the middle 20% of coun-
ties (42 players versus 31 and 37 players per million inhabitants, respectively).  Seth
Stephens-Davidowitz, In the N.B.A., ZIP Code Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/opinion/sunday/in-the-nba-zip-code-matters.html?_r=0.
Among whites, the poorest counties produced only one-third the number of NBA players
produced by the richest counties. Id.
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come from poor neighborhoods.208  Stephens-Davidowitz also found that
African-American players were statistically more likely to have been born to
married parents and to mothers over the age of twenty than the averages
within the African-American male population.209  A rich set of social condi-
tions and policies are implicated in providing fair conditions of equality of
opportunity, including popular beliefs that may perpetuate racial stereo-
types;210 copyright policy is only a very small piece of this picture—but it is a
quite positive piece.
There is a final, interesting point we would like to make about “fair con-
ditions of equality of opportunity”: the actuality of such conditions depends,
in part, on belief that there are such conditions.  It is well-known that “dem-
onstration effects” are important.  For young minority children, just the
knowledge that someone like them has amassed a vast fortune opens the door
to greater possibilities in their own future.211  Social psychologists have estab-
lished the fact that people form their own self-image and personality in part
by learning from their social environment.212  They learn about their life
prospects by observing the fate of others like them.213  To take just one of
many relevant studies, British researchers found convincing evidence of
same-race role models increasing self-esteem and expanding career horizons
for young people.214  Most important, in this study the highest-impact role
models were those that had achieved material success, as opposed to success
in moral or general social spheres.215
Wealth, in other words, is a powerful symbol of life’s possibilities—of the
offices and positions open to all.  Therefore, the large fortunes amassed by
minority celebrities affect many people beyond their own immediate circle of
family and friends.  While a young person’s immediate environment is, of
course, paramount, knowledge that other people like themselves have “made
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 See, e.g., Samuel R. Hodge et al., Theorizing on the Stereotyping of Black Male Student-
Athletes: Issues and Implications, 2 J. FOR STUDY SPORTS & ATHLETES IN EDUC. 203 (2008),
https://cnr.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/StereotypingAthletes.pdf (discussing
how beliefs on racial stereotypes impose psychological barriers on academic performance,
particularly for black males).
211 JAMES S. DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING, AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
(1949).
212 ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNI-
TIVE THEORY 390–453 (1986) (describing how human behavior is affected by imitation and
internalizing self-images, among other factors).
213 Henry P. Sims, Jr. & Charles C. Manz, Social Learning Theory: The Role of Modeling in
the Exercise of Leadership, 3 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. MGMT. 55, 55–63 (1982).
214 TIRZA LEADER ET AL., DEP’T FOR COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, AN EXPERIMENTAL
TEST OF THE IMPACT OF BLACK ROLE MODEL MESSAGES: RESEARCH TO INFORM THE REACH
ROLE MODEL PROGRAMME (2009), http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/10518/1/1281347.pdf (finding,
in a study of over 1200 minority youth in Britain, that the highest and longest-lasting effects
from exposure to role models occur when role models have achieved material—as
opposed to moral/social—success).
215 Id.
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it” matters, too.  The long-term impact of role models on the overall distribu-
tion of wealth is hard to measure, but it is surely there.216
III. DISTRIBUTIVE BELLS AND WHISTLES OF COPYRIGHT—
CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE
Of course, the law vesting these exclusive rights in authors is only the
first step.  The rules that govern licensing and sale of copyrights matter too.
One could have a system that vests exclusive rights in the author inalienably.
This would cut down on coerced assignments and other contracts by which
authors are dispossessed of most or all of the value of their works. But absent
workarounds, even this would not necessarily help authors.  For one thing, it
would require every author to commercialize his or her work directly, reduc-
ing the benefit from more efficient agents that specialize in publishing, distri-
bution, and the like.  It would also make collaborative works difficult and
would greatly limit works requiring substantial investments of capital.  These
usually require multiple creative “inputs” to be assigned to a single entity.217
On these grounds, a system that allows for the transfer of exclusive rights
is much better for wealth distribution to authors; at the same time, it raises
the possibility that authors will be underpaid, cheated, or otherwise unfairly
divested of their exclusive rights.  In this respect, copyright seems no differ-
ent than real or chattel property law.
Except that there are striking differences.  In fact, the American copy-
right system has a series of elements designed to strengthen the author’s
position, both procedurally and substantively.  In this Part, we first review
many of these (familiar) elements; we then turn to ways in which the copy-
right system could further strengthen wealth distribution to authors.
A. Procedural Protection of Authors
The Copyright Act offers some protection to authors by clarifying and
cabining the conditions for the transfer of copyright.  Section 202 clarifies
216 Another take on “demonstration effects” is the economic literature on “tournament
theory.”  This body of work arose in an attempt to explain extremely high executive sala-
ries, for example, those of Fortune 100 CEOs.  The basic idea is that the wages paid to
these executives serve as an inducement for lower-level employees to work hard in hopes
that they too can “win the tournament.” See Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, Personnel
Economics: The Economist’s View of Human Resources, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 94–95 (2007)
(describing tournament theory); see also Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive
Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487,
523 (2013) (noting that “[t]he [ultra-high executive] wage derives its utility not from
ensuring the retention of productive workers, but rather by eliciting the effort of other
employees at lower levels of the organization” and that “the potential for pay raises within
an organization provides a bounty or prize that incentivizes employee effort by inducing a
competition to win the promotion”).
217 For a good discussion of the economics of copyright in collective works, see
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1716–17
(2013).
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that “[t]ransfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy . . . in
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copy-
righted work embodied in the object.”218  This protection seems particularly
important in the art world, but may also preempt contests over copyright
ownership after the physical transfer of master tapes, unpublished manu-
scripts and papers, and the like.  Indeed, section 202 reverses the common
law copyright rule applied by some courts that unconditional sale of the phys-
ical object embodying an unpublished work implied conveyance of the copy-
right in the work.219
Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act provides one of those few places
where federal law restricts state contract law, providing that any transfer of
exclusive rights in a copyright “is not valid unless an instrument of convey-
ance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by
the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”220
The writing requirement precludes claims of oral transfer agreements.  In
addition, the “signed by the owner” requirement has been used to prevent
assignees from attempting to use unilateral documentation to prove a
transfer.221
This protection of the author/owner is stricter than the typical state stat-
ute of frauds.222  It has also expanded over time: the 1909 Act had this signed
writing requirement only for assignments, grants, or mortgages; the 1976 Act
applies the requirement to all transfers of exclusive rights, including exclu-
sive licenses.223  Policymakers should ensure that this meaningful procedural
safeguard is not undermined in the digital networked environment.224
218 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
219 Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc’y, Inc., 39 N.E. 2d 249 (N.Y. 1942); Otten v. Curtis
Publ’g Co., 1951 WL 4651, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1951) (“When a creative artist sells
without reservation the product of his effort he effects a merger of the created work itself
and the separable ‘copyright,’ i.e., the legal monopoly in publication.”).  In New York, this
presumption was abrogated by statute in 1966.  1966 N.Y. Laws 1444, ch. 668, amending
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW art. 12–E, §§ 223, 224; see 3–10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.09(B)(2) (2008) [hereinafter NIMMER].
220 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
221 Snook v. Blank, 92 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mont. 1948) (holding an affidavit signed by an
alleged assignee to be insufficient under a parallel provision in the 1909 Act); PMC, Inc. v.
Saban Entm’t, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding an internal “deal
memorandum” insufficient).
222 Konigsberg Int’l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 356–57 (9th Cir. 1994).
223 NIMMER, supra note 219, § 10.03(A)(1)(a); id. § 10.03(B)(1) (describing how,
under the 1909 Act, “[a] copyright license, as distinguished from an assignment, could be
made orally, or could be implied from conduct,” and that “[t]his was true under the 1909
Act of both exclusive and nonexclusive licenses” (footnotes omitted)).
224 In a 2013 decision, a Fourth Circuit panel concluded that clicking “yes” prior to
uploading photos constituted a signed writing transferring exclusive rights when the click-
wrap Terms of Use (TOU) language had included the statement: “By submitting an image,
you hereby irrevocably assign . . . all of your rights, title and interest in and to the image
submitted.”  Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591,
593 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added by the Court of Appeals).  We agree with the Nimmer
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B. Termination of Transfer in American Copyright Law
Beyond these procedural protections, the most extraordinary “pro-
author” elements of U.S. copyright law are surely its substantive provisions on
“termination of transfer,” “reversionary rights,” or “recapture” of copyright
rights.225
Under the 1909 Act, American copyright had two terms (in the last form
of the law, each term being twenty-eight years).226  Copyright could be regis-
tered for the initial term by the author or the “proprietor” of the copyright.
The statute, however, stated that the renewal term could be secured only by
“the author . . . if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the
author, if the author be not living, or . . . the author’s executors, or in the
absence of a will, his next of kin.”227  The legislative history of this provision
was clear: “[I]t should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal
term,” a right of which he should not be “deprived.”228
The 1909 law gave authors some negotiating power, but publishers
adapted by requiring authors to sign deals in which the author contractually
committed to assign the renewal term to the publisher as soon as it came into
existence.  In its 1943 case Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons the
Supreme Court held that such a contract could be enforced against the
author personally.  The majority opinion was blunt in its rejection of Con-
gress’s apparent interference with freedom of contract, refusing to accept
either that “authors are congenitally irresponsible”229 or that the Court
should “draw a principle of law from the familiar stories of garret-poverty of
some men of literary genius.”230
treatise that this was a troubling result. NIMMER, supra note 219, § 10.03(A)(1)(b); see also
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A term of
an [online, standard-form] agreement is unenforceable if it (a) conflicts with a mandatory
rule of federal intellectual property law; or (b) conflicts impermissibly with the purposes
and policies of federal intellectual property law . . . .”).
225 These are the various terms used. See generally Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer,
Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
799 (2010); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36 (2010); Michael A.
DeLisa, Note, The Right of Termination in Copyright Law: The Second Circuit’s Decision in Pen-
guin Books (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck Bodes Well for Authors, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 273 (2009).
226 Act of July 1, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976).
227 Id. (“[T]he author . . . if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the
author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not
living, then the author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin . . . .”).
Exceptions to this rule included renewal for works published posthumously, composite
works originally copyrighted by a proprietor, works copyrighted by corporate bodies, and
works made for hire. Id.
228 H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909); S. REP. No. 60–1108, at 14 (1909); see also Frank
R. Curtis, Protecting Authors in Copyright Transfers: Revision Bill § 203 and the Alternatives, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 805–06 (1972).
229 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
230 Id. at 657.
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Nonetheless, this system still had a great benefit for people on the
author’s side when the author died.  Because the renewal period copyright did
not exist until after the first term of the copyright (that is, after the twenty-
eighth year), the author’s contractual agreement was a commitment to trans-
fer the renewal copyright when it came into existence.  Once the author died, his
family and heirs were typically free to renew the copyright without any obliga-
tion to transfer it.231
The 1976 Act extended the length of copyright protection and created a
“unitary” term.232  For works created after the effective date of the Act—Jan-
uary 1, 1978—the two-twenty-eight-year-terms system was replaced by a single
copyright term running for the author’s entire life plus fifty years.  With no
need to renew the copyright, the author’s heirs would lose the negotiating
power to extract additional payments for the renewal.  So, to restore and
strengthen the author’s bargaining power, Congress created a new right of
termination.
For a work created under the 1976 Copyright Act, section 203 gives the
author—or her heirs—a right to terminate the grant of any copyright or
right under a copyright “at any time during a period of five years beginning
at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant.”233  In
other words, if Sarah finished a book in early 2005 and transferred the copy-
right to Big Publisher on April 1, 2005, she or her family could reclaim the
copyright anytime between April 1, 2040, and March 30, 2045.  Once the
author reclaims the copyright, she can keep the copyright until it expires or
sell it to someone again (this time without any termination right).
The legislative history is very clear that this thirty-five-year mechanism to
reclaim the copyright does not affect any contractual “right of cancelling or
terminating the agreement,” and does not change “the existing state of the
law” on when an author otherwise “may cancel or terminate a license, trans-
fer, or assignment.”234  It can only add to an author’s rights, in other words;
and never take away from them.  There were also special termination of
transfer provisions for works created before the 1976 Act came into effect.
When Congress added twenty years to copyright terms in 1998, it again
adopted a termination mechanism, section 304(c), allowing statutory heirs to
reclaim the newly-extended copyrights if they had not yet exercised the ter-
mination rights already embedded in the statute.235
1. The Clear Intent of Termination Is Redistribution of Wealth
For all three of these federal termination rights, there are some provi-
sions to safeguard the interests of the party that bought the copyrights, per-
haps the most important being that “[a] derivative work prepared under
231 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219–21 (1990).
232 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 2 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 3 (1976).
233 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012).
234 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 128 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 111 (1976).
235 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). See generally Menell & Nimmer, supra note 225.
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authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized
under the terms of the grant after its termination.”236  Many derivative works
are developed by corporate interests, the canonical one being a feature film
based on a novel, short story, or play.  But these safeguards for the corporate
side of the bargain should not mask the truly extraordinary idea of these
termination provisions.  To protect the author and her heirs, the Copyright
Act is quite explicit that “[t]ermination of the grant may be effected notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary.”237  Remember that following a Supreme
Court decision in 1943, authors could be forced to assign their renewal rights
before the renewal term started.  Congress was concerned that with a single
copyright term, companies would try an end-run around the new system and
force authors to sign an agreement that said “If you take back your copyright
under section 203, you contractually promise to re-grant it to me.”  So, the
1976 Act forbids that too.238  The Supreme Court was quite right when it
noted that “[t]he 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term, but pro-
vides an inalienable termination right.”239
An inalienable right is powerful stuff under American law,240 but the real
effect is to give authors and their heirs a chance to renegotiate the deal—a
“second bite” of the apple.  And that is strong redistributional medicine.
What justifies this extraordinary market intervention?  Congress has only
given us two reasons.  The first is simply, in the words of the 1976 Act’s legis-
lative history, that “[a] provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors.”241  The second reason is that when the
author makes her first deal transferring the rights to her work, she is often in
a poor position to estimate the work’s value in the marketplace because of
“the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been
exploited.”242  In 1985, the Supreme Court reasoned that the termination
236 Id. § 203(b)(1); id. § 304(c)(6)(A).  This “Derivative Works Exception” does not
include the right to prepare further derivative works and the terminated grantee must con-
tinue to pay royalties or other payments “under the terms of the grant” even after termi-
nated.  Mill Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 153 (1985).  For ambiguities on this
protection, see NIMMER, supra note 219, § 11.02(C)(1).
237 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (emphasis added); id. § 304(c)(5) (emphasis added).
238 Id. § 304(c)(6)(D) (providing that “a further grant, of any right covered by a termi-
nated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the termination.”); see also
Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008); NIMMER, supra note 219,
§ 11.01(A) (“The [Fred Fisher] effect is avoided by invalidating agreements for post-rever-
sion grants until the reversion has occurred.”).
239 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (emphasis added).
240 See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy
in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994).
241 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 203, at 124 (1976).
242 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909) (“It not infrequently happens that
the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum.  If the
work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your
committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term,
and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that
right.”).
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right in the 1976 Act is “expressly intended to relieve authors of the conse-
quences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before
the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work
product.”243
The termination provisions have rightly been criticized as complex244
and some court decisions already arguably undermine Congress’s intent,245
but the bottom line is that in this particular form of highly regulated property, we
have chosen to enhance the likelihood that the author and her family will get a signifi-
cant share of the proceeds by giving her an opportunity to demand re-negotiation of the
deal—or the return of her property.246  We are not doing this for efficiency—
there is no reason to think it helps either efficient creation of works or the
efficient distribution of works already created.247  If anything, it slows down
business people because they have to deal with pesky authors and their fami-
lies.  How much the termination right disrupts the efficient distribution of
works depends on its implementation, an issue on which Congress and the
courts arguably do not see eye-to-eye.248  American courts have varied inter-
pretations of these statutory termination rights, sometimes clearly protecting
authors and their families from “litigation-savvy publishers”249 and some-
times seeming to side with the publishers.250  This is not the place to sort
243 Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1985).
244 For a detailed exposition of that complexity, see Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the
Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 FLA L. REV. 1329 (2010).
245 See, e,g., id. at 1368–71 (criticizing, on these grounds, Milne v. Slesinger, Inc., 430
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005), and Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.
2008)); see also Menell and Nimmer, supra note 225, at 808–12 (criticizing these same
opinions).
246 H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, § 203, at 124 (1976) (explaining that termination of transfer
is “a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers.”); S. REP. NO. 94-473
(1975) (same); NIMMER, supra note 219, § 11.01(B) (“The entire thrust of the termination
procedures under the current Act is to protect authors, given their unequal bargaining
posture.”)
247 Professor Guy Rub argues that it is inefficient.  Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite?
Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49 (2013).  Much of
Rub’s analysis assumes that publishers, at the time of purchasing a work from an author,
place a value on the work’s income stream that extends beyond the thirty-five-year termina-
tion windows.  We doubt that: we believe that the value of an asset from the thirty-sixth year
onwards rarely enters into these sorts of business calculations.
248 See generally Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of
Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145 (2011) (arguing that in some cases normative values
outweigh transaction cost considerations in IP law).
249 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2002).
250 The Second and Ninth Circuits have failed to follow the statutory regime for termi-
nation, allowing new contractual arrangements made near the time of termination to
extinguish the termination right.  Steinbeck, 537 F.3d at 193, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383
(2009); Milne, 430 F.3d 1036, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2006).  These two cases seem to
ignore the statutory language that the termination right survives “notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary” on the rationale that Congress’s purpose in giving authors a
“second bite of the apple” was achieved as long as an author or her heirs enjoyed “the
increased bargaining power conferred by the imminent threat of statutory termination to
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through the modest caselaw on termination of transfer: our point is only that
if the section 203 and 304(c) provisions work as intended, they are powerful
redistributive tools for authors and their families.
Of course, there will be occasions when copyrights revert to wealthy indi-
viduals.  Sometime before 2020, for example, Sir Paul McCartney—already a
billionaire—will reclaim many of the Beatles songs he co-wrote with John
Lennon.251  There have also been some cases where descendants of an
author make multiple, sometimes unseemly, attempts to retake copyrights.252
We do not think these cases detract from the general redistributive effect of
the termination of transfer system.
2. The Work-for-Hire Doctrine in Relation to Redistribution of Wealth
One cannot say that copyright’s termination right favors the “little guy”
without a meaningful discussion of the work-for-hire (or work made for hire)
doctrine.  Under the work-for-hire doctrine, when a work is prepared by an
employee in the usual course of employment the law vests the U.S. copyright
in that work in the employer as the author of the work.  Section 201(b) of the
Copyright Act is quite clear, “[i]n the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title.”253
enter into new, more advantageous grants.” Milne, 430 F.3d at 1043, 1046.  On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit has upheld termination despite an intermediary re-negotiation
where the court felt that the author’s side “did not intend to relinquish a known termina-
tion right,” and the Second Circuit has concluded that a prior settlement agreement from
a litigation between the author and the grantee was an “agreement to the contrary” that
could not eliminate the right of termination.  Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d
978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008); Marvel Characters, 310 F.3d at 290.
251 Emily Sheridan, Get Back to Where You Once Belonged: Sir Paul McCartney Set to Regain
Rights to Beatles Back Catalogue, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 15, 2013), www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshow
biz/article-2394325/Sir-Paul-McCarthy-set-win-rights-Beatles-catalogue.html.  Copyright in
those songs had belonged to the Associated Television Corporation, which had sold them
to Michael Jackson in 1985 for $47.5 million; in 2005, Jackson sold 50% of the rights to the
catalog to Sony for $95 million. Id.
252 And some argue that the life-plus-seventy-year copyright term disproportionately
benefits the distant heirs of long-deceased creators. See, e.g., William Patry, The Failure of the
American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 908 (1997)
(“Horror stories of famous musical compositions from the 1920s falling into the public
domain, thereby impoverishing the trust funds of composers’ grandchildren, were trotted
out to great effect at star-spangled congressional hearings in 1995.”).
253 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).  This is an extraordinary (or extraordinarily-poorly
worded) provision in a field where property rights are at times justified because protected
works often embody an expression of their creators’ personalities, as when Justice Holmes
described copyright as protecting works embodying a “personal reaction of an individual
upon nature.  Personality always contains something unique. . . . [A]nd a very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.  That something he
may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.”  Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographic Co.,188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903); see also MERGES, supra note 2, at 75 (“Kant
thought reliable expectations about ongoing possession of objects [i.e., property] enables
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The most important point about the work-for-hire mechanism is that it
undercuts any possibility of termination of transfer under 17 U.S.C. §§ 203,
304.  Corporate owners of intellectual property do not care who the “author”
is, but they care very much whether their intangible assets are subject to
authorial recapture.  Because the statute establishes the employer as the
“author,” the true individual authors are not initially vested with any copy-
right rights that they can later reclaim under the termination of transfer pro-
visions.  Indeed, the section 203 and 304(c) termination of transfer
provisions clarify that recapture of copyright does not apply to works-for-hire.
The work-for-hire doctrine was first codified in section 62 of the 1909
Copyright Act, which provided that “the word ‘author’ shall include an
employer in case of works made for hire.”254  The concept of “employer” was
broadly construed under that provision such that copyright ownership vested
in any person at whose “instance and expense” the work was created.255
Fairly described, the 1976 Act clarified and narrowed the circumstances
in which the doctrine applies.  In the employment context, section 101 clari-
fies that works-for-hire are only those “prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment.”  In independent contractor situations—the
“instance and expense” scenarios under the 1909 Act—the work-for-hire doc-
trine now applies only in nine specific business situations.  The key earmarks
are that a work be “specially ordered or commissioned” and that the “parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.”256
These nine categories of independent contractor relationships as work-
for-hire may be a reasonable reflection of practices in certain copyright sec-
tors, but they were also clearly the result of industry lobbying.  To some, this
makes the work-for-hire doctrine look like a fairly naked grab by employers
and other capitalists.  Under this scenario, powerful interests make sure that
the statute declares themselves to be the “authors” of creative works.  In 1999,
something positive to take place.  Stable possession permits the imprinting of some aspect
of a person, what Kant called his will, onto objects so as to enable the person to more fully
flourish.”); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property,
16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 81 (1998); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,
77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–50 (1988) (applying Hegelian personality theory to intellectual prop-
erty).  Even patent law, often thought to be about a more instrumental form of property
right, insists that all patents must name as inventors natural persons—a corporation can-
not invent anything. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4,
Mar. 20, 1883, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 (“The inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as
such in the patent.”); see also Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that even where an employee inventor had assigned ownership rights to
the employer, the employee had standing to bring an action to correct the patent and be
listed as an inventor; reputational advantages of inventorship are enough of a concrete
interest to provide standing to sue).
254 Act of July 1, 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976).
255 See Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567–68 (2d Cir.
1966); Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965).
256 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 57 19-JAN-17 10:47
2016] copyright  and  distributive  justice 569
one or more record labels made an effort to have sound recordings added to
the types of original expression giving rise to works-for-hire, which would
have resulted in the record labels being considered the “authors” of these
works.  This effort—labeled “outrageous,” “surreptitious,” “unconscionable,”
and “sinister”—thoroughly backfired on the record companies.257  Congress
amended the law on the record labels’ behalf without discussion, then
amended it back after hearings and a hailstorm of criticism from musicians,
adding a bizarre provision that courts should take no notice of the legislative
volte-face.258
Given all this history—and the statute’s strange form of declaring corpo-
rations to be “authors”—commentators defending the interests of authors
have understandably criticized work-for-hire.259  But for us the real question
is whether work-for-hire’s avoidance of the termination right is fair to the
creative individuals involved.  In the circumstances in which the employer
provides the vast bulk of the capital investment for a work’s creation and
where many fragmented individual contributions must be assembled to make
a marketable end product, it seems reasonable that the natural person
authors would not be able to reclaim/claim the copyright after thirty-five
years.  The canonical instance is “a motion picture or other audiovisual
work,” which typically costs millions of dollars and incorporates creative con-
tributions from dozens of contributors.260  In the circumstances in which the
corporate entity has designed the creative program already and the natural
person is commissioned to prepare a “contribution to a collective work,” or
“a supplementary work,” again, it seems reasonable to surmise that on both
financial and personhood metrics, the case for a right to reclaim/claim the
copyright after thirty-five years may be relatively weak.  On the other hand,
where the artist superintends the creation of her own creative program, and the
corporate interest provides, at best, only funding for the work’s completion
257 Eric Boehlert, Four Little Words: How the Record Industry Used a Tiny Legislative Amend-
ment to Try to Steal Recording Copyrights from Artists—Forever, SALON (Aug. 28, 2000), http://
www.salon.com/2000/08/28/work_for_hire/ (describing the record company action as a
“seemingly surreptitious move,” and noting how Don Henley described the attempt as “sin-
ister at its root”; folk singer Dar Williams described it as “outrageous”; artist manager Ron
Stone called it “unconscionable”); see also Bill Holland, Acts’ Reps Decry C’right Clause, BILL-
BOARD, Jan. 15, 2000, at 75; Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Repeal Near?: RIAA’s Involvement Goes
Back 10 Years, BILLBOARD, July 29, 2000, at 103; Don Waller, Music Battle Moves to D.C.,
VARIETY, May 25, 2000. See generally Kathryn Starshak, Note, It’s the End of the World as Musi-
cians Know It, Or Is It? Artists Battle the Record Industry and Congress to Restore Their Termination
Rights in Sound Recordings, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 71 (2001).
258 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing that neither the amendment to include sounds record-
ings as works-for-hire nor its prompt rescission “(A) shall be considered or otherwise given
any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or
disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination”).
259 See, e.g., MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM: A WRITER’S MANIFESTO 127 (2009) (in
relation to author’s writings, “nothing should or need be” a work-for-hire).
260 For a similar rationale regarding employer ownership of patents, see Robert P.
Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999).
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(as is a good description of many sound recordings), “work for hire” status is
inappropriate.
So, (1) if the principal “real world” effect of the work-for-hire doctrine is
to annul the inalienable termination right in certain circumstances, and (2)
those circumstances roughly track situations in which the natural person cre-
ator(s) have not made the principal financial investment and/or have sub-
stantially less “personhood” invested in a work, we are not troubled by the
work-for-hire doctrine.  Are there more elegant (and less offensive) ways to
achieve this outcome other than calling corporations “authors”?  Yes, there
are—and comprehensive copyright reform should fix this.  But for a national
copyright law that has the extraordinary mechanism of termination of trans-
fer, the basic division the law draws is defensible.
C. The Emerging Trend Toward Droit de Suite
While the United States is almost unique in its strong termination of
transfer provision for authors, American copyright is becoming a laggard in
another type of redistributive mechanism increasingly common in copyright
and related rights laws: “droit de suite.” Droit de suite or resale royalty now exists
in over seventy countries as well as on the statute books of California and
Puerto Rico.261  Generally speaking, droit de suite laws provide that when a
painting, sculpture, or other object of fine art is resold, a percentage of the
sale price goes back to the artist.  In some jurisdictions, the percentage is
only of the increase in the work’s value, not the overall sale price.
France promulgated the first droit de suite law in 1920,262 but it was not
until 2001 that the European Union mandated that all of its Member States
establish an inalienable resale royalty right belonging to “the author of an
original work of art.”263  The EU Directive applies to single works and limited
edition lithographs, photographs, and works of applied art “provided they
are made by the artist himself or are copies considered to be original works
261 See generally Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The
Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968); M. Elizabeth Petty, Note, Rauschenberg,
Royalties, and Artists’ Rights: Potential Droit de Suite Legislation in the United States, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 977 (2014).  For problems and criticisms, see Alexander Bussey, Note,
The Incompatibility of Droit de Suite with Common Law Theories of Copyright, 23 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1063 (2013); Nithin Kumar, Note, Constitutional Hazard: The Cali-
fornia Resale Royalty Act and the Futility of State-Level Implementation of Droit de Suite Legisla-
tion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 443 (2014).
262 See 33 LE DROIT D’AUTEUR, June 15, 1920, at 61, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/
bpt6k5497736n/f1.item.
263 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/84 of SEPT. 27, 2001, ON THE RESALE RIGHT FOR THE BENE-
FIT OF THE AUTHOR OF AN ORIGINAL WORK OF ART, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC) [hereinafter
RESALE DIRECTIVE].  Article 1(1) of the directive provides:
Member States shall provide, for the benefit of the author of an original work
of art, a resale right, to be defined as an inalienable right, which cannot be
waived, even in advance, to receive a royalty based on the sale price obtained for
any resale of the work, subsequent to the first transfer of the work by the author.
Id. at 34.
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of art.”264  The Directive sets a variable royalty rate, starting with 4% of the
sale price up to C= 50,000 and four decreasing percentage tiers above that as
the total sale price increases.265
In recent decades, many important jurisdictions outside the EU have
adopted their own resale royalty laws, including Mexico (1996),266 Brazil
(1998),267 India (1999),268 Turkey (2008),269 and Australia (2009).270  As of
2013, both the U.S. Copyright Office and a private artists’ rights group in
Canada placed the number of jurisdictions with droit de suite laws at seventy or
more.271
Since the resale royalty right concerns transfer of chattel property, it falls
starkly outside the usual paradigm of intellectual property laws.  On the other
hand, since creators in the fine arts typically derive little income from
exploitation of section 106 rights (reproduction, derivative works, etc.), the
resale royalty right can be seen as a regulatory intervention to support the
creative process through the market, in a way familiar from core copyright
rights.272  In circumstances in which the value of a piece of fine art increases
dramatically, the resale royalty works much the same as the statutory termina-
tion right, giving the artist a “second bite at the apple,” i.e., a chance to claim
a meaningful portion of the increased value.  Where the price of the piece of
art has remained stagnant or even dropped, one may question the fairness of
exacting a percentage of the sale for the artist.  On the other hand, the resale
royalty may not be that different from statutory provisions that require
authors to receive a small payment for lending of books already sold (the
“lending right” below), or that require classes of audiovisual creators to
264 Id. at 35.
265 Id.
266 Ley Federal de Derechos de Autor [LFDA] art. 92bis, Diario Oficial de la Federa-
ción [DOF] 1-1-2012, últimas reforma DOF 13-1-2016 (Mex.); Reglamento de la Ley Fed-
eral de Derecho de Autor art. 31bis, 31ter, 31quater, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 14-9-2005 (Mex.).
267 Decreto No. 9.610 art. 38, de 19 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 20.2.1998) (Braz.).
268 Copyright (Amendment) Act art. 53A, 2012, No. 27, Acts of Parliament, 2012
(India); Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 49, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India).
269 Sayili Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri Kanunu [Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works], No.
5846 of 1951, last amended by No. 5728 of 2008 (Turkey).
270 Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009 (Cth) (Austl.).
271 CANADIAN ARTISTS’ REPRESENTATION/LE FRONT DES ARTISTES CANADIENS, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR AN ARTIST RESALE RIGHT IN CANADA 3 (2013), http://www.carfac.ca/carfac
wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Artists-Resale-Right-Proposal-CARFAC-Final-April-2013
.pdf; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, RESALE ROYALTIES:
AN UPDATED ANALYSIS 2 (2013), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resale
royalty.pdf [hereinafter USCO 2013 STUDY].
272 See NIMMER, supra note 219, § 8C.04[A][1] (noting “[t]he droit de suite may be con-
ceived of as an attempt to equalize the copyright status of fine artists with that of literary
and other authors”).
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receive payments for exploitation of audiovisual works in particular
windows.273
The State of California274 and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico275
remain the only U.S. jurisdictions with resale royalty laws—and California’s
law has been subject to some adverse rulings.276  But over the years a federal
resale royalty has been proposed numerous times on Capitol Hill277 and dis-
cussed intermittently in the press and legal academe.278  In 2011, Senator
Herbert Kohl and Representative Jerrold Nadler began a new effort to secure
a federal resale royalty with the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, a bill
Congressman Nadler subsequently reintroduced in the 113th Congress in
July 2014.279  The most organized opposition to the proposal comes from
auction houses Sotheby’s and Christie’s who “have spent about $1 million in
273 In that spirit, a 2014 U.N. report lumped droit de suite with other types of provisions
where “[c]opyright laws may also establish a creator’s right to share in the proceeds from
future sales of their work, which may not be waived by contract.”  Farid Shaheed (Special
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Rep. on Copyright Policy and the Right to Science
and Culture, ¶ 45, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014).
274 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 2012).  The resale royalty applies to any “original
painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass,” id. § 986(c)(2), and
only to works by living artists or artists who died after 1982; it also exempts sales for less
than $1000, id. § 986(b)(2).
275 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1401h (West 2012) (“Any person who creates a work of art
is entitled to receive five (5) percent of the increase in the value of said work at the
moment it is resold.  Said amount shall be deducted from the seller’s earnings and his/her
agent or proxy shall be jointly responsible for that amount.  In those cases in which the
whereabouts of the author are not known, the resulting amount shall be deposited in his/
her name in a special account to be opened by Copyright Registrar.”).
276 In a 2015 en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Act’s application
to sales outside California (of art owned by California residents) violated the dormant
Commerce Clause and severed that aspect of the law.  Sam Francis Found. v. Christies,
Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  Subsequently, a district court found that
the California law was preempted by federal copyright law’s first sale doctrine. In re Estate
of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 974 (C.D. Cal.  2013).
277 Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of Copyrights’
Report, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 396 n.11 (1992) (noting that proposals to incorpo-
rate a resale right under federal law had been discussed by legislators as far back as the
1960s); see USCO 2013 STUDY, supra note 271, at 6–7.  Often the proponents of a federal
resale royalty have been distinguished members of Congress known for getting legislation
passed, including Representative Henry Waxman (Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act of
1978); Senator Edward Kennedy (Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986); and Senator
Kennedy and Representative Edward Markey (Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987). Id.
278 Marshall A. Leaffer, Of Moral Rights and Resale Royalties: The Kennedy Bill, 7 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 234 (1989); John Henry Merryman, Comment, The Wrath of Robert Raus-
chenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 103 (1993); Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American
Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509 (1995); Robert
Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME (Mar. 11, 1974), http://www.time.com/
time/printout/0,8816,943572,00.html.
279 See Rep. Nadler on the ART Act, Hearing on Artists’ Resale Rights, ARTFIXDAILY (July 15,
2014), http://www.artfixdaily.com/artwire/release/2251-rep-nadler-welcomes-hearing-on-
artists’-resale-rights.
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the last couple of years to hire well-known legal and lobbying talent in
Washington.”280
To us, it speaks volumes that the major auction houses—gatekeepers of
an “art market [that] has become a high-priced playground for billionaires
and hedge-fund moguls”281—would so stridently oppose giving artists a small
piece of the pie.  In 2014, an internet trade association—with auction site
eBay being a member—opposed the resale royalty “arguing it will constrict
the free market.”282  If nothing else, such opposition shows that droit de suite
is a true redistributive tool, albeit only in a narrow range of activity.
D. Other Redistributive Bells and Whistles—Real and Prospective
In reviewing these “pro-little guy” elements of copyright law we are not
casting copyright law as an ideal property-creating, property-redistributing
legal mechanism.  Our point is only that compared to conventional property,
American statutory copyright law includes some features designed to
enhance creators’ incomes.  But there are plenty of other mechanisms that
can be built into an intellectual property statute to orient wealth and income
toward the individual creative or inventive person.
Almost all such mechanisms are, in effect, interventions in and regula-
tion of the contractual environment by which creative individuals transfer
rights to their original expression.  Termination of transfer and droit de suite
provisions are strong (some would say strong-arm) interventions in the mar-
ket.  They are, at least in part, inalienable endowments that others cannot
extract via contract.  They “stick to” creators in ways that directly help them
make more money.  Other interventions have a lighter touch.  Some of these
come under the broad umbrella of “equitable remuneration,” but we must be
cautious in the use of this concept.  Often “equitable remuneration” refers to
statutorily-mandated payments to the copyright owner for uses that have not
been authorized ex ante.  But here “equitable remuneration” means statuto-
rily-mandated payments to the author or performing artist, as a distinct and
separate matter from payments to the copyright owner.
A prime example of such equitable remuneration is the system estab-
lished in the European Union’s 2006 Rental Rights Directive.283  The direc-
tive mandates an “exclusive right to authorise or prohibit rental and lending”
of works that belong to, on the one hand, authors and performers and, on




282 Id. (describing the argument of Michael Beckerman, president and chief executive
of “the Internet Association, the Washington-based trade group representing the biggest
Internet companies”).
283 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2006/115 OF DEC. 12, 2001, ON RENTAL RIGHT AND LENDING
RIGHT AND ON CERTAIN RIGHTS RELATED TO COPYRIGHT IN THE FIELD OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 28 (EC) [hereinafter 2006 RENTAL DIRECTIVE].
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the other hand, producers of both phonograms and films.284  It then sets up
a mandatory right to equitable remuneration for rental of copies when the
former creators have transferred their economic rights to the latter group:
1. Where an author or performer has transferred or assigned his rental
right concerning a phonogram or an original or copy of a film to a phono-
gram or film producer, that author or performer shall retain the right to
obtain an equitable remuneration for the rental.
2. The right to obtain an equitable remuneration for rental cannot be
waived by authors or performers.285
The directive further provides that in the case of “public lending” an EU
country may decline to apply the general rental and lending right “provided
that at least authors obtain a remuneration for such lending.”286
In addition to EU-level requirements of equitable remuneration to indi-
vidual creators, different EU countries provide for individual creators to
receive equitable remuneration from a range of activities and via a range of
mechanisms.  French law requires equitable remuneration to be paid to per-
formers for both the broadcasting of their recordings and for the private copy-
ing of their recordings.  Both remunerations are distributed by collecting
societies;287 the latter is funded through a “levy” on all blank media.288  In
contrast, Germany and Spain impose such levies on both blank media and
recording devices.289
284 Id. at 29.
285 Id. at 30.  The Directive provides that administration of this inalienable right “may
be entrusted to collecting societies representing authors or performers,” leaving considera-
ble discretion to the EU Member States. Id.
286 Id. (emphasis added).  The 2006 Rental Directive also provides a separate right of
equitable remuneration to performers for “broadcasting and communication to the pub-
lic” including the provision that EU Member States:
[S]hall provide a right in order to ensure that a single equitable remuneration is
paid by the user, if a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a repro-
duction of such phonogram, is used for broadcasting by wireless means or for any
communication to the public, and to ensure that this remuneration is shared
between the relevant performers and phonogram producers.  Member States
may, in the absence of agreement between the performers and phonogram pro-
ducers, lay down the conditions as to the sharing of this remuneration between
them.
Id. at 31.
287 Two collecting societies work in tandem for musicians: one for featured artists,
ADAMI (L’ADMINISTRATION DES DROITS DES ARTISTES ET MUSICIENS INTERPRÈTES), https://
www.adami.fr/en/about-adami.html, and one for background artists, SPEDIDAM (SOCIÉTÉ
DE PERCEPTION ET DE DISTRIBUTION DES DROITS DES ARTISTES-INTERPRÈTES), http://www
.spedidam.fr/.
288 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [IPC] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] Art. L.
311-4 (Fr.).
289 Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965,
BGBL I at 1273, § 54, last amended by Gezetsez [G], Oct. 1, 2013 BGBL I at 3728 (Ger.);
Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996 of 12 April, Approving the Revised Text of the Law on
Intellectual Property art. 25 (B.O.E. 1996, 97) (Spain).
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Separate from statutory remuneration, French law bars single, lump-sum
payments to authors in publishing contracts, “requir[ing] instead that the
author participate proportionally, through royalties, in the work’s reve-
nues.”290  Achieving the same thing—at least for surprisingly successful
works—German law includes a “best seller” provision that allows an author to
demand renegotiation of a contract for “more adequate participation” when
payment to the author has been “strikingly disproportionate to the income
and benefits from the use of the work.”291  Beyond all the specific elements
of equitable remuneration required under its copyright law, in 2002 Ger-
many added a general provision with three propositions, sometimes in ten-
sion: (a) that an author’s remuneration should be contractually agreed, (b)
that if the author’s compensation is not contractually specified, “remunera-
tion shall be at an equitable level,” and (c) that “[i]f the agreed remunera-
tion is not equitable, the author may require from his contracting partner
assent to alter the contract so that the author is assured an equitable remu-
neration.”292  We are confident that the main effect of this last provision is
not to trigger court cases demanding re-negotiations, but to make corporate
interests dealing with individual authors keenly aware that it is best to be
reasonable and equitable ex ante in their dealings with creators.
CONCLUSION
The dominant discourse in copyright scholarship has treated creative
individuals only as a means to an end: generation of original expression.
When scholars have expressed any concern at all about distributive justice, it
has been only about fair access to information and material, in other words,
as a bookend to the dominant utilitarian analysis.  But when we turn our
attention away from considerations of fair access to works, and toward consid-
erations of a fair distribution of income and wealth, we come to see a
290 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
LAW, AND PRACTICE 270 (3d. ed. 2013).  But French law does not dictate what the royalty
rate should be. Id.
291 Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights], BGBL I, § 32a
(author’s own translation of the phrases “weitere angemessene Beteiligung,” and “auffälligen
Missverhältnis zu den Erträgen und Vorteilen aus der Nutzung des Werkes,” respectively).  The
provision dates back to a 1965 amendment of German law and has rarely been used suc-
cessfully by authors.  Reto M. Hilty & Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration” in Copy-
right Law: The Amended German Copyright Act as a Trap for the Entertainment Industry in the
U.S.?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 401, 412–13 (2004).
292 GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 290, at 271 (quoting Urheberrechtsgesetz
[UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights], BGBL I, § 32a(1)); see also Hilty & Peukert,
supra note 291, at 417.  A number of countries require “equitable remuneration” or mini-
mum participation rights for employed inventors whose inventions earn substantial reve-
nue for an employer (so-called “service inventions”).  The payments are required
notwithstanding the fact that the inventors have assigned their patent rights to the
employer (as is standard practice). See, e.g., Alexander Harguth, Patent Ownership in Ger-
many: Employers vs. Employees, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 15, 17 (2013) (describing Ger-
man “service invention” regulations).
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neglected side of copyright.  Our main point throughout has been this: from
the limited evidence available, the copyright system appears to contribute
positively and significantly to economic distributive justice in the U.S.
economy.
Using the framework of John Rawls’s principles of justice, we have
explored how copyright increases the income of middle tier members of soci-
ety who are trying to support themselves in creative professions, professions
we all—everyone from politicians to law professors—laud as part of the desir-
able “information economy” future.  We have also reviewed mechanisms in
existing copyright law—from minor procedural speed bumps to termination
of transfer —that show copyright’s orientation to protecting the prospects of
creative individuals.  We further discussed other tools in the copyright tool-
box to improve the distributive footprint left by copyright, including droit de
suite for artists and equitable remuneration mechanisms used in other devel-
oped economies.
Another requirement of Rawlsian distributive justice is that all individu-
als have fair equality of opportunity for all “offices and positions.”  There is
no question that American society as a whole has failed to provide such
equality of opportunity for women and minorities, particularly for African
Americans.  In that context, copyright has been a rare if not unique institu-
tion providing opportunity for African Americans to achieve the greatest eco-
nomic success: the list of the wealthiest black citizens of the United States is
utterly dominated by people whose fortunes are rooted in the copyright
industries: entertainment, music, sports, publishing, and the like.  Given the
massive economic barriers facing the African-American community gener-
ally, this is a striking realization.  Not that copyright in itself is an effective
anti-poverty program; not that it offsets structural racism in its myriad forms.
Our point here is simply that copyright has been uniquely effective in permit-
ting African Americans something closer to fair equality of opportunity to
achieve the highest levels of wealth.
In the end, our argument is simple: copyright, though a form of prop-
erty, does not only or disproportionately reward large corporate interests.
Copyright is, and can be, an important tool to promote a just distribution of
income and wealth in society.
This has political as well as economic ramifications.  The historian and
biographer A.N. Wilson wrote in the 1980s that “[p]roperty never has been
abolished, and never will be abolished.  It is simply a question of who has it.
And the fairest system ever devised is one by which all, rather than none,
[are] property owners.”293  That sentiment certainly comports with the vision
of the framers of the American Republic.  These were individuals who saw
property ownership as a bulwark against tyranny and a mechanism to
advance the individual.  The little dollop of economic power copyright con-
fers helps creative people support themselves.  A thriving creative class feeds
293 A. N. WILSON, TOLSTOY 365 (1988).
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our culture and ultimately our polity.  In helping distribute income to crea-
tive individuals and supporting them as a professional class, copyright forms
part of a thriving democratic republic and a just society.
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